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In the best of times, immigrants should only be deported according 
to the rule of law and not by the whim of executive branch officials. Now, 
it is imperative. Yet the statute authorizing removal of immigrants for 
“crimes involving moral turpitude” invites officials to base their 
prosecutorial choices on political or personal views. As a result, defense 
attorneys advising their clients on the immigration consequences of pleas 
have no basis for prediction. Although the Supreme Court long ago 
rejected the argument that the “moral turpitude” clause was void for 
vagueness, one of the Court’s most recent decisions now makes that 
conclusion unsupportable. The notion that due process permits officials 
to banish legal permanent residents based on “moral turpitude,” which 
never comported with common sense, is now legally incorrect. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Every year, many Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs, or “green 
card holders”) are removed from the United States for past “crimes 
involving moral turpitude” (CIMT).1 Many of these LPRs have lived in 
the United States since their youth. The phrase “crime involving moral 
turpitude” appears in the immigration statute, so the courts are bound 
to enforce it, if it is constitutional. Common sense strongly suggests that 
deporting people based on subjective impressions of morality is 
unconstitutionally vague, yet the United States Supreme Court has 
long rejected the vagueness argument. In this Article, we argue that one 
of the Court’s recent decisions, the 2015 case of Johnson v. United 
 
Copyright © 2017 Lindsay M. Kornegay, Evan Tsen Lee. 
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 1.  The terms “exclusion” and “expulsion” are no longer officially used by the INA. 
However, prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRAIRA), an exclusion was a denial of entry into the country, and an expulsion was the removal 
of a deportable alien already in the country. The IIRAIRA condensed the two terms into one, 
categorizing them both as “removal proceedings.” Removal proceedings can either be 
deportations of aliens previously admitted into the country, or determinations that an alien is 
inadmissible prior to entry. See infra Section II.B. 
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States,2 now compels the conclusion that the CIMT clause is 
unconstitutionally vague.3 
The Article proceeds in four parts. First, we examine the relevant 
portion of the controlling statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA). In this same section, we review the judicial treatment of CIMT 
over the years, including the Supreme Court’s longstanding 
determination that, for vagueness purposes, CIMT is treated as if it 
were a criminal statute. This section also surveys the relevant literature 
on CIMT. Second, we review the Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson and 
outline its proper, limited scope.4 Third, we explain why Johnson is 
squarely inconsistent with the CIMT doctrine as it is currently 
structured. Finally, we explain why the provision cannot plausibly be 
given a saving construction and therefore must be struck down on its 
face. 
I. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (INA) 
A. The Relevant Text 
The INA contains two references to crimes involving moral 
turpitude, one with reference to inadmissibility and the other with 
 
 2.  135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 3.  Although the Supreme Court recently rejected a vagueness challenge based on Johnson, 
that should have no impact on the vagueness analysis regarding CIMT.  In Beckles v. United 
States, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), the Court upheld the United States Sentencing Guidelines against a 
vagueness challenge under Johnson. Because the federal guidelines were rendered “effectively 
advisory” by the Court’s decision in Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2004), the 
guidelines are “not amenable to a vagueness challenge.” 580 U.S. at ___, slip op. at 8. However, 
the CIMT provision of the INA is binding, not advisory, thus making Beckles inapposite. 
 4.  Johnson’s holding that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act is 
unconstitutionally vague has already been used to invalidate other laws, and has created 
controversy about whether it requires other laws to be invalidated. See United States v. Gonzalez-
Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 677–79 (5th Cir. 2016) (declining to extend Johnson’s reasoning to the 
phrase “crime of violence” in the sentencing enhancement provision of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)); see 
also United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 378–79 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 
135, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2016) (similarly distinguishing Johnson’s reasoning to hold that a different 
statute is not unconstitutionally vague). But see United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 
(7th Cir. 2015); Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 
16(b) in other contexts using Johnson’s reasoning). Professor Jennifer Lee Koh has elsewhere 
made a powerful argument that Johnson invalidates many immigration provisions, including 
“crimes involving moral turpitude,” on the ground of vagueness. See Jennifer L. Koh, 
Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1127, 1177–78 (2016) 
(describing CIMT as perhaps “the most confusing removal ground in the INA.”). Professor Koh 
did not focus on CIMT but rather analyzed Johnson’s effect on immigration laws more generally. 
This Article is the first to make the full argument. 
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reference to removal. The provision regarding inadmissibility appears 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1182, and states in pertinent part: 
 
(a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are 
inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to 
receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United 
States:. . .  . . . 
(2) Criminal and related grounds 
 
(A) Conviction of certain crimes 
 
(i) In general 
Except as provided in clause (ii), any alienconvicted of, 
or who admits having committed, or who admits 
committing acts which constitute the essential elements 
of—— 
 
(I) crime involving moral turpitude (other than a 
purely political offense) or an attempt or 
conspiracy to commit such a crime, or 
 
(II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to 
violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United 
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled 




The provision regarding removal appears at 8 U.S.C. § 1227, and 
states in pertinent part: 
 
(a) Classes of deportable aliens 
 
Any alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall, upon 
the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is 
 
 5.  Subsection (a)(2)(A)(ii) contains exceptions based on the youth of the immigrant at the 
time of commission and on the brevity of the maximum possible penalty. 
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within one or more of the following classes of deportable 
aliens: 
. . .  
 
(2) Criminal offenses 
 
(A) General crimes 
 
(i) Crimes of moral turpitude 
 
Any alien who—— 
 
(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude 
within five years (or 10 years in the case of any alien 
provided lawful permanent resident status under 
Section 1255(j) of this title) after the date of 
admission, and 
 
(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of 




(ii) Multiple criminal convictions 
 
Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted 
of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not 
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, 
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless 
of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is 
deportable. 
The INA does not define the term “moral turpitude” but instead 
leaves it to case law, which is surveyed here later. 
II. THE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION REGULATION 
Regulation of immigration within the United States dates back to 
colonial times.6 Initially, the regulation of immigration was left to the 
 
 6.  H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS 
UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
ANALYSIS 5 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY]. 
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colonies.7 The Constitution and subsequent case law, however, gave the 
power to control and regulate immigration to Congress.8 
A. History of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
The first federal legislation regulating immigration was the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of March 3, 1875.9 The Act simply 
excluded those convicted of certain crimes, and it prohibited importing 
women for prostitution.10 In 1875, the Supreme Court declared tax and 
bond requirements for incoming aliens in the states of New York, 
Louisiana and California to be unconstitutional for violating the 
Commerce Clause.11 The taxes and bonds had been an attempt to 
produce funds to accommodate the large numbers of aliens then 
entering the states.12 Principally in reaction to that decision, lobbyists 
began fighting for federal financing to deal with immigration.13 The 
ruling was seen as a declaration that immigration was to be left in 
Congress’s hands.14 
In reaction to record levels of immigration, the subsequent 
amendment to the Act increased the list of excludable aliens, redefined 
some of the existing categories, and addressed concerns of involuntary 
immigration (the offloading of perceived undesirables by other 
countries).15 The Act of 1891 excluded insane persons, polygamists, and 
anyone afflicted by contagious diseases.16 Additionally, and 
significantly, criminals made excludable by the Act included “persons 
who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.”17 The amendment was 
passed without any comment on the meaning of moral turpitude and 
was the first time the phrase was used in immigration law. 
The list of excludable aliens continued to expand in 1903 when 
Congress added several grounds for exclusion. These additions 
excluded anarchists, people with mental and physical deficiencies, 
prostitutes, “professional beggars,” and any “helpless” immigrant, as 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  The statute generally appears at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1778. 
 9.  H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 6. 
 10.  Id. at 6–7. 
 11.  Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875). 
 12.  H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 7–8. 
 13.  Id. at 8. 
 14.  13 CONG. REC., 5107 (1882) (statement of Rep. Van Voorhis). 
 15.  H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 16.  Id. at 10. 
 17.  Id. 
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well as anyone accompanying them.18 Congress repealed the 1903 Act 
in 1907, and reenacted many of the provisions with additions. The class 
of individuals excluded due to physical defects was expanded greatly to 
include people with “feeble minds,” anyone with tuberculosis, and 
anyone determined by a surgeon to be “mentally or physically 
defective, such mental or physical defect being of a nature which may 
affect the ability of such alien to earn a living.”19 In addition, the Act 
excluded aliens who admitted having committed a felony or other 
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude (without actually 
having been convicted) in addition to aliens actually convicted of 
CIMTs.20 Again, the phrase “moral turpitude” was used without 
definition or comment. 
After attempts at passing new legislation had been vetoed three 
times, once by President William Howard Taft and twice by President 
Woodrow Wilson,21 Congress overruled Wilson’s second veto in 1917. 
This resulted in the next significant change in the Act. The most 
controversial amendment to the 1917 Act was the inclusion of a literacy 
requirement that had been previously vetoed by President Grover 
Cleveland in 1897.22 This requirement excluded from entry into the 
United States anyone who was older than 16 and who was unable to 
read in any language. The 1917 amendments left the criminal provisions 
unchanged. The health provisions were expanded to include “persons 
of constitutional psychopathic inferiority” and alcoholics.23 “Vagrants” 
were also added to the list of those excluded from entry.24 
The Act of 1918 expanded the class of excludable persons, and the 
Act of 1924 provided the first quota on immigrants.25 The Act also 
 
 18.  Id. at 12–14. 
 19.  Id. at 15. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 16. 
 22.  Id. at 16, 18. Cleveland had stated that the literacy requirement “afford[ed] . . . a 
misleading test of contented industry and supplie[d] unsatisfactory evidence of desirable 
citizenship or a proper apprehension of the benefits of our institutions.” Id. at 11–12. 
 23.  Id. at 20. 
 24.  Id. at 21. 
 25.  Id. at 22–23. The current quota functions as a visa percentage maximum that cannot be 
exceeded by any one country in a fiscal year. “No more than 7 percent of the visas may be issued 
to natives of any one independent country in a fiscal year; no more than 2 percent may issued [sic] 
to any one dependency of any independent country. The per-country limit does not indicate, 
however, that a country is entitled to the maximum number of visas each year, just that it cannot 
receive more than that number. Because of the combined workings of the preference system and 
per-country limits, most countries do not reach this level of visa issuance.” Per Country Limit, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/ glossary/country-limit (last 
visited July 18, 2016). 
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included a section maintained in current legislation in Section 
212(a)(20) prohibiting entry of aliens without proper documents.26 The 
1917 and 1924 legislations were left largely unchanged until 1952, with 
most amendments making language or administrative changes. 
The largest changes to immigration law came in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, which repealed, revised, and 
recodified the then-existing statute.27 President Harry Truman vetoed 
the Act largely due to the numerical limitations provided by the 
national origin quota system.28 Truman’s veto was overruled, and the 
Act remains largely in effect today. 
Throughout each of these revisions and recodifications, “moral 
turpitude” remained in the statute, persistently undefined. 
Additionally, most of the grounds for exclusion from previous acts were 
retained in the 1952 Act, with some expansions and additions. These 
additions included narcotics addicts, aliens engaging in immoral sexual 
acts, aliens entering under false statements, and aliens aiding illegal 
immigration.29 
The current Immigration and Nationality Act is codified in Title 8, 
chapter 12 of the United States Code.30 The Act provides several bases 
for inadmissibility and several circumstances in which removal is 
appropriate. Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA), removal proceedings were 
categorized as either exclusions or expulsions. An exclusion was 
defined as denying an alien entry into the country, whereas an 
expulsion referred to removing a deportable alien already in the 
country.31 The IIRAIRA amended the terminology to encompass both 
exclusions and expulsions with the term “removal proceedings.”32 
Removal proceedings thus include both aliens who are deportable33 
and aliens who are inadmissible.34 Deportation occurs when an alien 
who was previously admitted into the United States becomes subject 
 
 26.  H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 23. 
 27.  Id. at 26. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 26—27. 
 30.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012). 
 31.  Definition of Terms, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/ 
immigration-statistics/data-standards-and-definitions/definition-terms# (last visited June 20, 
2016) [hereinafter DHS Definitions]. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012). 
 34.  Id. § 1182(a). 
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to removal for violating the immigration laws.35 Inadmissible aliens are 
those determined not to meet the criteria in the INA for admission, and 
they may be placed in removal proceedings.36 Inadmissible aliens may 
also be allowed to withdraw their applications, or may be subject to an 
expedited removal if they either have no entry documents, or if their 
documents are improper.37 Between the years 2005 and 2013, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determined nearly two 
million aliens to be inadmissible, with an average of more than 200,000 
per year.38 During that time, an additional half-million aliens were 
deported.39 
There are various reasons for removal of both deportable and 
inadmissible aliens. The INA lists six separate classes in which 
deportation is appropriate, including inadmissibility at the time of 
entry, criminal offenses, failure to register, security related offenses, and 
unlawful voting.40 The criminal offense class is broken down into six 
subclasses including general crimes, controlled substance crimes, 
firearm crimes, miscellaneous crimes, crimes of domestic violence, and 
crimes involving trafficking.41 The general crimes subclass further 
includes two subsections based on crimes involving moral turpitude. 
One subsection concerns crimes involving moral turpitude committed 
within five years after admission and with a sentence of one year or 
longer.42 The second subsection makes any alien deportable who, after 
the time of admission, is convicted of two or more crimes involving 
moral turpitude.43 
B. History and Judicial Construction of the Phrase “Moral Turpitude” 
i. “Moral turpitude” in American law generally 
Despite the fact that the term “crime involving moral turpitude” 
has a long history within the law, the term has never been exactly 
 
 35.  DHS Definitions, supra note 31. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 2013 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 97 
(2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_yb_2013_0.pdf. 
 39.  Id. at 103. 
 40.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). 
 41.  Id. § 1227(a)(2). 
 42.  Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 43.  Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The grounds for inadmissibility in the INA are very similar to 
those listed for deportability, though many sections are more thoroughly described and specific 
and there are several additional categories. 
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defined.44 That inexactitude has earned the term persistent criticism. 
The phrase “moral turpitude” first appeared in American defamation 
law, making slanderous words actionable when they would, if true, 
subject the slandered party “to an indictment for a crime, involving 
moral turpitude, or subject him to an infamous punishment.”45 Since 
that time, its use has expanded to evidence law, voting rights, juror 
disqualification, attorney malpractice and, of course, immigration law.46 
The New York Supreme Court adopted the term “moral turpitude” 
in 1809 as a test for slander per se.47 The court intended to create a 
category of defamation cases in which the alleged crime would be 
considered harmful enough to the victim’s reputation that damages 
would be presumed. Under such conditions, the court believed that the 
phrase would “conduce to certainty,” making those instances of slander 
per se obvious.48 This was reflexive of the social belief that there were 
“reputation-defining norms of conduct that courts could easily 
discern.”49 
After its debut in the law of slander, the phrase moral turpitude was 
adopted in the law of evidence, under the belief that reputation was 
relevant to witness credibility.50 Multiple states allowed evidence of acts 
involving moral turpitude to impeach witnesses.51 
Since reputation and credibility were considered highly important 
character measures, it is unsurprising that Congress embraced moral 
turpitude as a metric for denying admission to and excluding 
immigrants. Good moral character appears to have been a priority in 
attempts to “shape . . . the polity.”52 Congress used the phrase to 
attempt to draw a line between “the orderly and the disorderly.”53 The 
1891 Act’s use of the phrase without comment demonstrates Congress’ 
desire for a flexible standard that allowed for hand selection of those 
 
 44.  See Derrick Moore, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the Void-for-Vagueness 
Argument is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813, 816 (2008) (“The 
phrase . . . is unclear and vague.”). 
 45.  Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188, 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809). 
 46.  Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1001 (2012). 
 47.  Brooker, 5 Johns. at 188. 
 48.  Id. at 192. 
 49.  Simon-Kerr, supra note 46. 
 50.  Id. at 1026. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 1039. 
 53.  Id. at 1045 (quoting WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE 216 (1996)). 
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deemed suitable for entry. The subsequent amendment and expanded 
use of the phrase in 1907 was, again, not explained or defined.54 
Despite the use of “moral turpitude” for longer than a century, the 
phrase has not been used consistently among circuits or individual 
Supreme Court justices.55 The most common definition cited in court 
opinions and law journals is from Black’s Dictionary: “[An] act of 
baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which 
man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the 
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man 
. . . .”56 Though this definition has held constant and has been 
continuously cited for many years, it does little to shed light on the 
proper application of the phrase to particular offenses. The definition 
calls upon an agency and/or judge to act as the supreme arbiter of 
morals, an often-inconsistent sentiment dependent on many factors 
including region, gender, and time period.57 Social morality has been 
described as a “notoriously plastic” concept58 that constitutes an 
“invitation to judicial chaos.”59 
This amorphous standard has resulted in a tangle of inconsistent 
rulings affording little predictability.60 This inconsistency has shifted 
with social norms over time, making it impossible to predict whether 
one thing held to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude at one 
time would continue to bear that brand of infamy at another. Professor 
Julia Simon-Kerr provides a detailed account of the history of the use 
of the phrase, in which she demonstrates just how flexible the standard 
is and how drastically it has changed over time.61 When it was a 
standard for slander, the phrase meant significantly different things for 
 
 54.  See Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV. 117, 118 (1929) (“[T]he 
phrase has been widely employed . . . in legislation dealing with immigration . . . .”). 
 55.  See infra Section IV-A. 
 56.  Moral Turpitude, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 57.  Simon-Kerr, supra note 46, at 1004–05 (“Even in early defamation cases, courts were 
troubled at the lack of familiar legal guideposts and disinclined to use the standard as a platform 
for their own views of moral conduct. Other courts simply declined to adopt the standard because 
it would require them to ‘search moral and ethical authors, rather than legal writers.’” (quoting 
Skinner v. White, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 471, 474 (1836) (per curiam))). 
 58.  Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 59. People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 134 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, J., dissenting). Although some 
people believe that religious morality as codified in church doctrine is fixed, objective, and 
absolute, that simply cannot be said of social morality. 
 60.  See Note, supra note 54, at 117 (“Violation of the Volstead Act and petit larceny have 
recently been held to involve moral turpitude; manslaughter, violation of a state liquor law, and 
fornication were held not to.”). 
 61.  See Simon-Kerr, supra note 46, at 1005–25 (tracing the standard’s nineteenth-century 
evolution from its origins in slander through its application to the law of evidence). 
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men than it did for women. A man’s act of moral turpitude connoted 
“disloyalty, oath-breaking, and deception in financial matters”; a man’s 
moral turpitude was made up entirely of the man’s notion of loyalty 
and integrity.62 In contrast, the phrase as applied to a woman indicated 
“violations of female honor norms requiring sexual purity.”63 Thus, 
while a man’s moral worth was bound up in his abstinence from fraud 
and his loyalty to contract and oath, a woman’s was based entirely on 
her sexual morality. The impact of gender norms on individuals’ 
treatment before the court was no secret; one court even stated 
explicitly that “the sex of the parties [must be] considered.”64 
Gender norms are not the only generational influence on the 
meaning of moral turpitude. Views on violence have also changed since 
the standard was introduced into law. In the beginning, a crime of 
violence against another could be excused as a defense of honor, while 
a crime of violence against property was oft times more reprehensible. 
A striking example is found in an 1851 slander case involving cow 
poisoning, which exhibits more moral turpitude than do crimes of a 
“higher legal grade, and hence the accusation of it may render a man 
more infamous in the estimation of the public.”65 The court noted that 
even homicide can be mitigated by the heat of passion, but “no 
circumstances can possibly extenuate the moral turpitude of that 
wretch who will poison his neighbor’s horse or cow.”66 
Though shocking to our modern sentiments about violence against 
humans, this opinion’s high valuation of livestock property was likely 
unremarkable for the time.67 The opinion may also have been different 
if the incident had taken place in a large metropolitan area rather than 
in a farming community in Iowa. This all graphically illustrates the 
plasticity of the concept of moral turpitude and the impossibility of 
developing it into a standard that does not expand and contract 
dependent on time period and location. As one judge memorably 
quipped, “Moral turpitude is a compass with the directional needle 
removed.”68 
 
 62.  Id. at 1012. 
 63.  Id. at 1013. 
 64.  McAlmont v. McClelland, 14 Serg. & Rawle 359, 362 (Pa. 1826). 
 65.  Burton v. Burton, 3 Greene 316, 318 (Iowa 1851). 
 66.  Simon-Kerr, supra note 46, at 1018 (quoting Burton, 3 Greene at 318). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  In re Berk, 602 A.2d 946, 951 (Vt. 1991) (Morse, J., concurring). 
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The most famous judicial critique of the CIMT doctrine is Justice 
Jackson’s eloquent dissent in Jordan v. De George.69 In De George, the 
Court held that deportation should be treated as a criminal penalty for 
purposes of constitutional analysis, yet upheld the constitutionality of 
CIMT as applied to the crime of conspiracy to defraud the United 
States of taxes on distilled spirits. 
The Court’s treatment of deportation as akin to punishment 
pointed to a conflict among the federal circuits regarding the definition 
of moral turpitude.70 Jackson denied that the Court could provide a 
succinct and basic definition of moral turpitude sufficient to resolve 
that split.71 He argued that Congress employed the phrase knowing full 
well that it was highly ambiguous:72 
If we go to the dictionaries, the last resort of the baffled judge, we 
learn little except that the expression is redundant, for turpitude 
alone means moral wickedness or depravity and moral turpitude 
seems to mean little more than morally immoral.73 
In De George, defendant and government agreed that “moral 
turpitude” was ambiguous and had proposed rival tests to clarify its 
meaning. De George argued that the test should be the level of violence 
involved in the crime; the government argued that the test should be 
the seriousness of the offense.74 Of these two tests, said Jackson, only 
De George’s would result in a sufficiently definite construction.75 
“Seriousness” as a test for moral turpitude was unworkable because all 
offenses must be of a degree of seriousness, else they would not be 
denounced as crimes.76 
Jackson also considered the suggestion that the test for moral 
turpitude could be hitched to the traditional distinction between crimes 
mala prohibita and crimes mala in se.77 However, he pointed out that 
this distinction was far from clear-cut and had been the subject of 
 
 69.  341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 70.  Id. at 233 (citing United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940); 
Maita v. Haff, 116 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1940) (both holding that fraud involves moral turpitude)). 
 71.  De George, 341 U.S. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 72.  See id. at 233–34 (“‘[A] crime involving moral turpitude has not been defined. No one 
can really say what is meant by saying a crime involving moral turpitude.’”) (quoting Hearings 
Before House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 10384, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 
8 (1916) (statement of Rep. Adolph Sabath)). 
 73.  Id. at 234 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 74.  Id. at 235. 
 75.  Id. at 235–36. 
 76.  Id. at 236. 
 77.  Id. 
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debate.78 The concept of malum in se, as well as the notion of moral 
turpitude, reverted back to the common law practice of blending 
“religious conceptions of sin with legal conceptions of crime.”79 As 
such, Jackson continued, moral turpitude will always fluctuate with 
differences in time, culture, and locality. “This is a large country[,] and 
acts that are regarded as criminal in some states are lawful in others,” 
Jackson stated.80 Lower court opinions applying moral turpitude rested 
not on consistent usage but rather on the “moral reactions of particular 
judges to particular offenses.”81 “How many aliens have been deported 
who would not have been had some other judge heard their cases, and 
vice versa, we may only guess,” Jackson and his fellow dissenters 
concluded.82 “That is not government by law.”83 
ii. “Moral turpitude” in immigration law 
Despite the convoluted history and consistent judicial critique of 
the phrase, a fair number of offenses are always considered to involve 
moral turpitude, with courts generally finding explanation unnecessary. 
Murder and attempted murder,84 forcible rape,85 prostitution and 
solicitation of prostitution,86 theft with intent to permanently deprive 
 
 78.  Id. at 236–37. 
 79.  Id. at 237 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 80.  Id. at 237–38. 
 81.  Id. at 239. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 239–40. 
 84.  See, e.g., In re Nalini Nagappa, A018 197 83, 2010 WL 1747411, at *1 (BIA 2010) 
(“[V]oluntary manslaughter and attempted murder are extremely serious crimes involving moral 
turpitude.”); Matter of Lopez-Amaro, 20 I. & N. Dec. 668, 673 (BIA 1993) (“[M]urder is a crime 
involving moral turpitude . . . .”); Matter of Sanchez-Linn, 20 I. & N. Dec. 362, 366 (BIA 1991) 
(“[V]oluntary manslaughter and attempted murder . . . are two extremely serious crimes 
involving moral turpitude.”); Matter of Awaijane, 14 I. & N. Dec. 117, 119 (BIA 1971) (“[T]he 
crime of which the respondent was convicted [attempted murder] did involve moral turpitude . . . 
.”). 
 85.  See, e.g., People v. Mazza, 175 Cal. App. 3d 836, 844 (1985) (“Rape fits every suggested 
definition of moral turpitude.”). 
 86.  See, e.g., Florentino-Francisco v. Lynch, 611 F. App’x. 936, 938 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(“[P]rostitution is a CIMT . . . .”); In the Matter of W, 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951) (“[T]he 
crime of practicing prostitution involves moral turpitude.”). 
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(including petty theft),87 and possession of child pornography88 are 
always CIMT. Failure to register as a sex offender is never a CIMT.89 
However, there are many other offenses sometimes considered CIMT 
and other times not. Among the offenses that may or may not be CIMT 
 
 87.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he element of 
moral turpitude would continue to be present whether the theft be petty or grand.”); Soetarto v. 
INS, 516 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 1975) (“Theft has always been held to involve moral turpitude . . . 
.”); Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (“[P]etty theft [is] a crime which does 
involve moral turpitude . . . .”); In re De La Nues, 18 I. & N. Dec. 140, 145 (BIA 1981) (“Burglary 
and theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, are crimes involving moral turpitude.”); In re 
Scarpulla 15 I. & N. Dec. 139, 140–41 (BIA 1974) (“[T]heft or larceny, whether grand or petty, 
has always been held to involve moral turpitude . . . .”); Matter of Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 
333 (BIA 1973) (“[T]hat the theft may have been petty is immaterial to the question of whether 
or not it involved moral turpitude . . . .”). 
 88.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Santacruz, 563 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[K]nowing possession of 
child pornography is a crime involving moral turpitude.”). 
 89.  See, e.g., Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885, 889 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[V]iolating a 
registration law . . . is categorically not a crime involving moral turpitude . . . .”); Totimeh v. 
Attorney General, 666 F.3d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he BIA’s determination that Minnesota’s 
predatory offender registration statute is a crime involving moral turpitude . . . is wrong as a 
matter of law.”). 
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are manslaughter,90 fraud,91 sex offenses against children,92 child 
 
 90.  See, e.g., Carter v. INS, 90 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[M]anslaughter stemming from 
assault and battery is properly classified as a crime of moral turpitude.”); Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 
571, 573 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e cannot say the BIA has gone beyond the bounds of reasonableness 
in finding that an alien who recklessly causes the death of her child . . . has committed a crime that 
involves moral turpitude.”); De Lucia v. Flagg, 297 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1961) (“So long as the 
homicide is voluntary and not justifiable no amount of provocation can remove it from the class 
of crimes involving moral turpitude.”); Pillisz v. Smith, 46 F.2d 769, 770 (7th Cir. 1931) (“We know 
of no greater moral law than that which discountenances the taking of human life without 
excuse . . . . We hold, therefore, that moral turpitude was involved in the crime . . . .”); United 
States ex rel. Allessio, 42 F.2d 217, 217 (2d Cir. 1930) (“The crimes for which he was convicted 
[including first degree manslaughter] involved moral turpitude.”). But see, e.g., Matter of 
Ghunaim, 15 I. & N. Dec. 269, 270 (BIA 1975) (“Murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes 
involving moral turpitude; involvuntary [sic] manslaughter is not.”); Matter of Lopez, 13 I. & N. 
Dec. 725, 727 (BIA 1971) (“[T]he respondent was convicted of the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter, a crime not involving moral turpitude.”). 
 91.  See, e.g., Miranda-Romero v. Lynch, 797 F.3d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[A] conviction 
under [the statute] . . . is thus categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.”); De Martinez v. 
Holder, 770 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[C]rimes requiring proof of an ‘intent to defraud’ 
necessarily involve moral turpitude.”); Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“[C]rimes that have fraud as an element . . . are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude.”); 
Rodriguez-Heredia v. Holder, 639 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Mr. Rodriguez’s conviction 
of identity fraud . . . is a crime involving moral turpitude.”); Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 
351 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[F]irst degree larceny in the form of defrauding a public community . . . is a 
crime involving moral turpitude . . . .); Cetik v. Gonzales, 181 F. App’x. 117, 118 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“Cetik’s conviction . . . constitutes a ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ . . . .”); Lozano-Giron v. 
INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1974) (“The phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ has 
without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct.”); Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 
F.2d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 1957) (“[A] violation of [the statute is] a crime involving moral turpitude.”); 
U.S. ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022, 1022 (2d Cir. 1931) (“Forgery in all its degrees . . . is 
thus a crime of moral turpitude.”). But see, e.g., Espino-Castillo v. Holder, 770 F.3d 861, 863 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (citing Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000) as “an isolated exception 
to the prevailing rule that a conviction for a fraud offense is categorically a crime involving moral 
turpitude”). 
 92.  See, e.g., Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Morales . . . does not 
admit committing a crime involving moral turpitude. We nevertheless conclude that her 
conviction for communication with a minor for immoral purposes is such a crime.”); Amaya v. 
Attorney General, 189 F. App’x 130, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he knowing endangerment of the 
welfare of a child by sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a child [involves 
moral turpitude] . . . .”); Sheikh v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1077, 1082 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Sheikh’s 
conviction, which involved having sexual intercourse with a minor, is a crime of moral 
turpitude.”); Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064, 1066 (4th Cir. 1976) (“[A] man’s carnal knowledge of 
a fifteen year old girl . . . is so basically offensive to American ethics and accepted moral standards 
as to constitute moral turpitude per se.”); Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1949) 
(“He committed acts of a loathsome nature upon . . . a 7 year old girl. This type of conduct . . . 
clearly involv[es] moral turpitude . . . .”); Matter of Dingena, 11 I. & N. Dec. 723, 729 (BIA 1966) 
(“[A]s long as sexual intercourse with a child constitutes a crime under the law of the state, we 
conclude . . . that moral turpitude is involved.”). But see, e.g., Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 
F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[Engaging in intercourse with a minor] is not categorically a crime 
involving moral turpitude within the meaning of the immigration statutes.”). 
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abandonment and child abuse,93 indecent exposure,94 assault,95 
misprision of felony,96 false statements,97 and driving under the 
influence.98 
 
 93.  See, e.g., Garcia v. Attorney General, 329 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Based upon 
the inherent nature of the crime of aggravated child abuse, Garcia has committed a crime of moral 
turpitude . . . .”); Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F.2d 1405, 1406–07 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[I]nflicting 
‘cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury’ upon a child is so offensive . . . that the fact that 
it was done purposely . . . ends debate on whether moral turpitude was involved.”); In the Matter 
of S——, 2 I. & N. Dec. 553, 556 (BIA 1946) (“[T]he act of abandoning a child under 16 years of 
age in destitute circumstances . . . [does] involve moral turpitude.”).  But see, e.g., Jean-Louis v. 
Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462, 464 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[S]imple assault under Pennsylvania law, 
where the victim is under 12 years of age . . . is [not] a crime involving moral turpitude . . . .”); 
Rodriguez-Castro v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A]ttempted misdemeanor 
child abandonment, with intent to return to the child . . . is [not] a crime involving moral 
turpitude . . . .”); Padernal-Nye v. Gonzales, 133 F. App’x 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he record 
of conviction does not demonstrate unequivocally that Nye was convicted of a willful offense or 
that her stepson actually suffered physical pain or mental suffering. Thus, Nye’s conviction did 
not necessarily qualify as a crime of moral turpitude.”). 
 94.  Matter of Medina, 26 I&N Dec. 79, 84 (BIA 2013) (“[A] person convicted of indecent 
exposure . . . has committed a crime involving moral turpitude . . . .”). But see, e.g., Nunez v. 
Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2010) (“California’s indecent exposure statute . . . . does not, 
however, categorically meet the federal standard for moral turpitude.”); Pannu v. Gonzales, 196 
F. App’x 566, 566–67 (9th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“The full range of conduct encompassed by 
California’s indecent exposure statute . . . does not constitute a categorical crime of moral 
turpitude . . . .”). 
 95.  See, e.g., Ceron v. Holder, 712 F.3d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur holding . . . that 
assault with a deadly weapon . . . is a crime involving moral turpitude . . . remains good law.”); In 
the Matter of G—— R——, 2 I. & N. Dec. 733, 740 (BIA 1946) (“[W]e cannot conclude . . . that 
the crime of assault with a deadly weapon in California never involves moral turpitude.”). But 
see, e.g.,; In re Sanudo, 23 I. & N. Dec. 968, 973 (BIA 2006) (“[D]omestic battery does not qualify 
categorically as a crime involving moral turpitude . . . .”); In re Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475, 475 
(BIA 1996) (“[A]n assault in the third degree . . . is not a crime involving moral turpitude.”); In 
the Matter of B——, 5 I. & N. Dec. 538, 541 (BIA 1953) (“It is firmly established that simple 
assault does not necessarily involve moral turpitude . . . .”); cf. Ceron v. Holder, 747, 783 F.3d 773 
(9th Cir. 2014) (“Turning more specifically to crimes of assault with a deadly weapon, we find 
guidance that points in both directions, leaving us uncertain whether a conviction . . . categorically 
involves moral turpitude.”); Partyka v. Attorney General, 417 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e 
reject the . . . contention that moral turpitude inheres in the . . . aggravated assault statute in all 
instances . . . . “); In the Matter of B——, 1 I. & N. Dec. 52, 54–55 (BIA 1941) (“[T]he crime of 
assault, second degree . . . may involve moral turpitude or may not . . . .). 
 96.  See, e.g., Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[M]isprision of a felony 
is a crime of moral turpitude . . . .”). But see, e.g., Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 707 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (“[M]isprision of a felony is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.”) 
 97.  See, e.g., Castillo-Torres v. Holder, 394 F. App’x 517, 521 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he BIA 
has held that making false statements to government authorities with an intent to mislead them 
is turpitudinous. . . . [W]e cannot say that [this] construction is unreasonable.”); Kabongo v. INS, 
837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[C]onvictions [for false statements] may be considered as 
involving moral turpitude.”); Matter of Patricia Pinzon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 189, 193 (BIA 2013) 
(“[C]rimes involving fraud or making false statements involve moral turpitude.”). But see, e.g., 
Notash v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[The] conviction [for attempted entry of 
goods by means of a false statement] does not categorically qualify as a crime involving moral 
turpitude.”). 
 98.  See, e.g., Marmolejo-Campos v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e 
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a. Fraud 
While the fraud precedents appear mixed, these cases can be 
reconciled by focusing on whether fraudulent intent is an essential 
element of the conviction. 
Exhibit A is Jordan v. De George,99 the decision from which Justice 
Jackson dissented, discussed in the previous section. De George 
involved a prior conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States 
of taxes on distilled spirits.100 “In every deportation case where fraud 
has been proved, federal courts have held that the crime in issue 
involved moral turpitude.”101 “[F]raud has consistently been regarded 
as such a contaminating component in any crime that American courts 
have, without exception, included such crimes within the scope of moral 
turpitude.”102 
As stated in De George, “true” fraud cases really are uniform.103 In 
United States ex rel. Portada v. Day,104 the prior conviction was for 
issuing checks with intent to defraud.105 The statute of conviction made 
punishable the issuance of a check with intent to defraud another 
person.106 Although it was not at all clear that the immigrant had 
intended to defraud anyone when he wrote the check, this statute 
explicitly required intent to defraud, and the federal court thus felt 
constrained to find that the conviction necessarily involved moral 
turpitude.107 
In Miranda-Romero v. Lynch, the prior conviction was for forgery 
in California.108 The statute stated in pertinent part: “Every person who, 
with intent to defraud another, forges, or counterfeits the seal of this 
State, the seal of any public officer authorized by law, the seal of any 
 
conclude that . . . aggravated DUI involving actual driving is a crime involving moral turpitude.”). 
But see, e.g., Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 78 (BIA 2001) (“The issue raised . . . is 
whether the respondent’s conviction for aggravated driving under the influence . . . is a crime 
involving moral turpitude. We find that it is not.”). 
 99.  341 U.S. 223 (1951). 
 100.  Id. at 224. 
 101.  Id. at 227. 
 102.  Id. at 229. 
 103.  Id. at 242 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Uniformity and equal protection of the law 
can come only from a statutory definition of fairly stable and confined bounds.”) 
 104.  16 F.2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). 
 105.  Id. at 329. 
 106.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 476(a) (West 2011). 
 107.  Portada, 16 F.2d at 329 (“[T]he result is harsh and unjust, [yet] I must, for I have no 
power to do otherwise, dismiss the writ and remand the relator to the custody of the 
Commissioner of Immigration.”) 
 108.  797 F.3d 524, 525 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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court of record, or the seal of any corporation, or any other public seal 
authorized or recognized by the laws of this State, or any other State, 
Government, or country . . . is guilty of forgery.”109 The Eighth Circuit 
held that this conviction qualified as a CIMT: “[W]e hold that a 
conviction under § 472 always includes the element of a specific intent 
to defraud and is thus categorically a crime involving moral 
turpitude.”110 
These two cases are merely examples drawn from a huge pool of 
cases in which convictions were found to be CIMT because fraudulent 
intent was an essential element of the offense.111 They are distinct from 
cases in which immigrants were convicted under a divisible statute 
containing distinct offenses, some of which required fraudulent intent 
and some of which did not. For example, in Hirsch v. INS,112 the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the BIA’s conclusion that a petitioner was deportable 
for CIMT even when the statute did require proof of a false, fictitious, 
or fraudulent statement.113 According to the court, a crime does not 
involve moral turpitude unless it requires proof of “evil intent.”114 
Although all “fraudulent” statements necessarily involve evil intent, 
not all “false” or “fictitious” statements involve evil intent. And, 
because the statutory language is phrased in the disjunctive, there was 
insufficient basis to conclude that the petitioner’s conviction involved 
evil intent, and, derivatively, moral turpitude.115 Thus, Hirsch supports 
 
 109.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 472 (West 2011). 
 110.  Miranda-Romero, 797 F.3d at 526. 
 111.  See, e.g., Rodriguez-Heredia v. Holder, 639 F.3d 1264, 1268–69 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(conviction for identify fraud where the statue required “fraudulent intent”); Planes v. Holder, 
652 F.3d 991, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2011) (conviction for passing a bad check where the statute required 
an “intent to defraud”, and fraud with access devices where the statute required an “intent to 
defraud”); De Martinez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2014) (conviction for criminal 
impersonation where the statute required “intent to defraud”); U.S. ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 
F.2d 1022, 1022 (2d Cir. 1931) (conviction for forgery where the statute required an “intent to 
defraud”); Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1974) (conviction for possessing 
counterfeit obligations where the statute required “intent to defraud”); Espino-Castillo v. Holder, 
770 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2014) (conviction for forgery where the statute required “intent to 
defraud”); Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 351 (2nd Cir. 2008) (conviction for larceny where 
the alien was convicted under part of a divisible statute that required “defrauding a public 
community”); Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 1957) (conviction for attempting 
to defeat or evade the income tax where the statute required “a false and fraudulent income tax 
return for said calendar year”); Cetik v. Gonzales, 181 F. App’x 117, 118 (2d Cir. 2006) (conviction 
for criminal possession of a forged instrument where the statute required “intent to defraud”); 
Miranda-Romero v. Lynch, 797 F.3d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 2015) (conviction for forgery where the 
statute required “intent to defraud”). 
 112.  308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962). 
 113.  18 U.S.C. § 80 (1946). 
 114.  Hirsch, 308 F.2d at 567. 
 115.  Id. 
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the conclusion that a conviction necessarily involves moral turpitude if 
proof of fraudulent intent is an essential element. 
Another case that, on first inspection, may appear inconsistent with 
this conclusion is Bobadilla v. Holder.116 There, the petitioner was 
convicted of, inter alia, giving a false name to a police officer.117 The 
statute of conviction stated, “Whoever with the intent to obstruct 
justice gives a fictitious name other than a nickname, or gives a false 
date of birth, or false or fraudulently altered identification card to a 
peace officer . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.118 
The Eighth Circuit found that petitioner’s conviction under this 
statute did not constitute a CIMT.119 Analysis of the statute might well 
lead a reader to the same conclusion reached by the court in Hirsch—
namely, that the statute was divisible, and that there was insufficient 
basis for the court to determine that Bobadilla had been convicted 
under one of the statutory parts requiring fraudulent intent. Instead, 
the court in Bobadilla took a different tack. It held that a conviction 
under this statute did not necessarily involve moral turpitude because 
it did not require proof that the police officer was actually misled.120 
After admonishing the government for treating every intentional act 
making “a government official’s task more difficult” as an act of moral 
turpitude, the court noted that “[t]he statute does not require proof that 
the ‘intent to obstruct justice’ was successful, or that it misled the police 
officer even for a moment.”121 The court then pointed to a case in which 
the state courts had upheld a conviction under this statute despite the 
fact that the defendant had immediately corrected himself after giving 
a false name, and presumably had never really misled the officer.122 
The court’s reasoning in Bobadilla is a bit surprising. It is not 
immediately clear why the fortuitous result of a police officer being 
misled or not being misled reflects on the turpitudinous quality of the 
defendant’s statement.123 Whether or not one agrees with the reasoning 
of Bobadilla, however, the decision does not contradict the conclusion 
 
 116.  679 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 117.  Id. at 1053. 
 118.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.506(1). 
 119.  Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057–58. 
 120.  Id. at 1058. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. (citing State v. Costello, 620 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)). 
 123.  Our critique of the reasoning in Bobadilla would seem to be supported by BIA’s 
statement that “there is no distinction for immigration purposes in respect to moral turpitude, 
between the commission of the substantive crime and the attempt to commit it . . . .” Matter of 
Awaijane, 14 I. & N. Dec. 117, 118–119 (BIA 1972). 
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that a conviction under a statute that requires fraudulent intent as an 
essential element is always a CIMT. It is true that the statute in 
Bobadilla contains the phrase “fraudulently altered identification 
card,” and it is also true that the court found no CIMT.124 However, 
Bobadilla was not convicted under the portion of the statute requiring 
proof of an altered identification card.125 He was convicted under the 
portion of the statute requiring proof of having given a fictitious 
name.126 Thus, Bobadilla was not convicted under a statute requiring 
proof of a fraudulent intent. 
b. Other crimes of dishonesty 
Although the fraud cases can be reconciled, the same cannot fairly 
be said of precedents involving other crimes of dishonesty. Such 
statutes come in many variations, and there is no identifiable litmus test 
that reliably predicts which variations will be found CIMT and which 
ones will not. Some courts focus on the mens rea—the evil intent—and 
some focus on the presence or absence of actual harm, which is an actus 
reus element. 
Some offenses involving dishonesty have been analogized to fraud. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that tax evasion is a CIMT 
because “‘intent to evade’ is synonymous with ‘intent to defraud’ 
within the meaning of the removal provisions of the INA.”127 Quoting 
a previous case, the court in Carty v. Ashcroft stated, “We have held that 
‘[e]ven if intent to defraud is not explicit in the statutory definition, a 
crime nevertheless may involve moral turpitude if such intent is 
“implicit in the nature of the crime.”‘“128 The panel distinguished a 
previous case which held that willfully structuring transactions with the 
intent to deprive the government of information did not involve moral 
turpitude.129 The difference, according to the court, between willfully 
structuring transactions and willfully evading taxes was the impact on 
the government.130 While structuring transactions was only intended to 
deprive the government of information, evading taxes deprived the 
government of revenue.131 
 
 124.  Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1053. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 128.  Id. at 1084 (quoting Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 129.  Id. (citing Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
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In In re Jurado-Delgado, the statute of conviction authorized 
punishment for anyone who, “‘[w]ith intent to mislead a public servant 
in performing his official function . . . makes any written false statement 
which he does not believe to be true . . . .’”132 The BIA held the 
petitioner’s conviction under this statute to be a CIMT because the 
crime involved deceit, and because it entailed actual obstruction of the 
performance of a public servant’s duties.133 Thus, both an aggravated 
mens rea element and an aggravated actus reus element were present 
in this case. 
Castillo-Torres v. Holder involved two convictions for false 
statements.134 The first conviction was obtained under a statute 
punishing any person who, “with intent of misleading a police officer 
to believe that the person is another actual person . . . gives the name, 
birthdate, or address of another person to a police officer in the lawful 
discharge of the peace officer’s official duties.”135 The second statute 
stated: 
A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if the person makes a 
false statement: 
(a) which the person does not believe to be true; 
(b) that the person has reason to believe will be used in a 
preliminary hearing; and 
(c) after having been notified either verbally or in writing that: (i) 
the statement may be used in a preliminary hearing before a 
magistrate or judge; and (ii) if the person makes a false statement 
after having received this notification, he is subject to a criminal 
penalty.136 
The Tenth Circuit held that convictions under both statutes involve 
moral turpitude, because intentionally misleading the government has 
almost always been held to involve moral turpitude.137 In Castillo-
Torres, then, the focus was on mens rea. 
Knowingly providing false information to public officials and on 
government forms has been held to involve moral turpitude by the 
Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.138 Additionally, the 
 
 132.  24 I. & N. Dec. 29, 34 (BIA 2006) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4904(a) (1992)). 
 133.  Id. at 34–35. 
 134.  394 F. App’x 517, 517 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 135.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-507 (Lexis Nexis 2017). 
 136.  Id. § 76-8-504.5. 
 137.  Castillo-Torres, 394 F. App’x at 521. 
 138.  Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006); Daibo v. Attorney General, 265 F. 
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BIA has held that knowingly and willfully making a materially false 
statement to obtain a United States passport in violation of 18 U.S.C 
Section 1001(a)(2) is a crime involving moral turpitude.139 The Seventh 
Circuit has held that knowingly providing false information to a police 
officer requires the intent to obstruct justice and therefore involves 
moral turpitude.140 On the other hand, two Ninth Circuit decisions have 
held that convictions involving intent to deceive the government were 
not CIMT because the deceit was not employed to obtain an item of 
value.141 These Ninth Circuit decisions are squarely inconsistent with 
Castillo-Torres and seem difficult to reconcile with the many cases from 
other circuits on providing false information to government officials 
and on government forms. 
Some cases focus not only on intent to deceive, but also on the actus 
reus element of actual harm done by the attempted deception. Recall 
Bobadilla v. Holder, discussed in the previous section.142 There, the 
petitioner had been convicted of giving a fictitious name to a police 
officer, and the court found it not to be a CIMT because the statute did 
not require proof that the officer had actually been misled. 
c. Misprision of felony 
Although there are only two recorded cases involving convictions 
for misprision of felony, they both involve convictions under the same 
federal statute, and they are at least somewhat in conflict with one 
another. Title 18 of the United States Code, § 4, states in pertinent part: 
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony 
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as 
soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other 
person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be 
fined under this Title or imprisoned not more than three years, or 
both.143 
In Itani v. Ashcroft, the petitioner was involved in a scheme to rent 
automobiles, report them stolen, and export them to Kuwait.144 He was 
 
App’x 56 (3d Cir. 2008); Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1988); Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 
F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2005); Holder, 394 F. App’x 517 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 139.  Matter of Patricia Pinzon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 189 (BIA 2013). 
 140.  Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 141.  See Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that when the only 
benefit the individual obtains is to impede the enforcement of the law, the crime does not involve 
moral turpitude); Notash v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 693 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 142.  679 F.3d 1052, 1052 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 143.  18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 144.  298 F.3d 1213, 1213 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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indicted for interstate transportation of stolen automobiles. Eventually 
he pled guilty to misprision of felony under Section 4. When the 
government sought to deport him for this conviction, he argued that it 
did not constitute a CIMT, but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed. 
“Misprision of felony is a crime of moral turpitude because it 
necessarily involves an affirmative act of concealment or participation 
in a felony, behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties and 
involves dishonest or fraudulent activity.”145 
The BIA has followed Itani, but another Court of Appeals has 
disagreed. In Robles-Urrea v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
conviction under Section 4 did not constitute a CIMT.146 The court 
criticized Itani for failing to analyze the commonly quoted requirement 
that, for a crime to involve moral turpitude, it must also be so base and 
deprived as to be morally outrageous.147 A conviction cannot involve 
moral turpitude simply because the person broke the law. If that were 
the case, all criminal convictions would be per se CIMTs.148 Although 
the Robles-Urrea opinion contains many statements that could be 
considered alternative rationales supporting its conclusion, its most 
insistent theme is that convictions for misprision of felony should not 
be regarded as categorically involving moral turpitude. After all, 
destroying the property of another, assaulting another person, and 
breaking and entering private property are not CIMTs.149 Yet, under 
Itani, misprision of any of these felonies would categorically constitute 
a CIMT. This is a paradox that the Robles-Urrea court was unwilling to 
entertain. Whichever of these two cases, Robles-Urrea or Itani, is 
correct, they cannot both be correct. There is an irreconcilable conflict 
regarding misprision of felony. 
d. Assault 
Assault may or may not involve moral turpitude. The BIA has held 
that, for an assault to involve moral turpitude, the assault statute in 
question must require both a specific intent and “a meaningful level of 
 
 145.  Id. at 1216. 
 146.  678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 147.  Id. at 709. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. (citing Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007); Cuevas-
Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1020 (burglary with intent to commit a crime within the residence)); Carr v. 
INS, 86 F.3d 949, 950–51 (9th Cir. 1996) (assault with a deadly weapon); Rodriguez-Herrera v. 
INS, 52 F.3d 238, 239–40 (9th Cir. 1995) (“knowingly and maliciously . . . caus[ing] physical 
damage to property of another”). 
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harm.”150 Additionally, the BIA has held that there must be an 
“aggravating dimension” indicative of the depraved nature of the 
conduct.151 Thus, to be a crime involving moral turpitude, an assault 
must involve (1) an evil intent; (2) a meaningful level of harm; and (3) 
an aggravating dimension. Therefore, simple assault is not a crime 
involving moral turpitude,152 but assault with a deadly weapon is,153 as 
is assault with the intent to inflict great bodily injury.154 Referencing the 
specific intent requirement, the BIA has reasoned that there is “little 
difference,” moral turpitude-wise, between assault with a deadly 
weapon and assault with intent to do great bodily harm.155 Indeed, 
somewhat confusingly, the BIA has even held that a reckless assault, 
coupled with actual serious bodily injury, constitutes a crime involving 
moral turpitude.156 In that instance, the aggravating dimension is 
presumably the serious bodily injury inflicted.157 
Furthermore, the BIA has indicated that a reckless assault with a 
dangerous weapon would also constitute a CIMT. In this instance, it is 
the use of a deadly weapon that converts a mere reckless assault into a 
crime involving moral turpitude.158 Given that the BIA has also held 
that “there is no distinction for immigration purposes in respect to 
moral turpitude, between the commission of the substantive crime and 
the attempt to commit it,”159 attempted assault with any of the above 
aggravating dimensions would constitute moral turpitude. 
 
 150.  In re Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. 239, 241–42 (BIA 2007). 
 151.  “In the area of assault, crimes involving moral turpitude ordinarily include an 
aggravating dimension.” In re Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475, 478 (BIA 1996); see also Esparaza-
Rodriguez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining that several courts also require 
an aggravating element indicative of the inherent vileness of the prohibited conduct). 
 152.  Matter of Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 139 (BIA 1989); Matter of Baker, 15 I. & N. Dec. 
50, 51 (BIA 1974). 
 153.  Matter of Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611, 612 (BIA 1976) (citing to Gonzales v. Barber, 
207 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1953)), aff’d, 347 U.S. 637, 400 (1954); U.S. ex rel. Morlacci v. Smith, 8 F.2d 
663, 664 (W.D.N.Y. 1925); Matter of Ptasi, 12 I. & N. Dec. 790, 791 (BIA 1968); Matter of 
Goodalle, 12 I. & N. Dec. 106 (BIA 1967); Matter of G_ R_, 2 I. & N. Dec. 733 (BIA 1946; A.G. 
1947). 
 154.  Matter of P, 15 I. & N. Dec. 5 (BIA 1976). 
 155.  Id. at 8–9. 
 156.  Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 478. 
 157.  The BIA has also drawn a dividing line between statutes that identify misconduct that 
causes bodily injury, and statutes that require serious bodily injury. Matter of Perez-Contreras, 
20 I. & N. Dec. 615 (BIA 1992). This creates an arbitrary line that may allow two similarly situated 
defendants to obtain vastly different immigration results dependent only on the state statutory 
language. 
 158.  “Assault is not a crime involving moral turpitude unless the crime has as an the [sic] 
element of a reckless state of mind coupled with the infliction of serious bodily injury or use of a 
dangerous weapon.” In re Aron Avalos Ramirez, 2006 WL 2427886, at *2 (BIA 2006). 
 159.  Matter of Awaijane, 14 I. & N. Dec. 117 (BIA 1972) (citing to U.S. ex rel. Meyer v. Day, 
LEE READY FOR ISSUE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/2018  4:45 PM 
72 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:1 
Assaults against peace officers have also caused notable conflict 
regarding moral turpitude. In Partyka v. Attorney General, the Third 
Circuit held that the aggravated assault of a police officer in the third 
degree was not a crime involving moral turpitude.160 The assault 
committed by Partyka was aggravated because it was committed 
against a police officer; it was in the third degree because the police 
officer suffered bodily injury.161 The court, referring to moral turpitude 
jurisprudence as an “amorphous morass,”162 held that the New Jersey 
statute in question was divisible and encompassed both reckless and 
negligent conduct.163 Because evil intent is not present in a negligent 
infliction of bodily injury, it cannot involve moral turpitude.164 Thus, 
because it was possible to violate the statute by acting only negligently, 
the offense could not be a CIMT.165 Despite this ruling, an unpublished 
opinion from the Third Circuit subsequently held the BIA had not 
erred in holding that a conviction for a third degree aggravated assault 
against a police officer under the same statute did involve moral 
turpitude.166 Referencing Partyka, the court reasoned that the alien in 
the present case had violated a different subsection of the statute than 
Partyka.167 Because the statute was divisible and covered both 
turpitudinous and nonturpitudinous conduct, the BIA’s holding that 
the offense in question was a CIMT was upheld.168 
e. Homicide 
For many years, the federal courts and BIA had a clear rule for 
homicides: murders, attempted murders, and voluntary manslaughters 
were always CIMT, and involuntary manslaughters never were.169 This 
rule remains in force for murders, attempted murders, and voluntary 
manslaughters, but no longer for involuntary manslaughters.  It now 
seems that an involuntary manslaughter qualifies as CIMT if the 
 
54 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1931)). 
 160.  417 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 161.  Id. at 412. 
 162.  Id. at 409. 
 163.  Id. at 412–13. 
 164.  Id. at 413–14. 
 165.  Partyka v. Attorney General, 417 F. 3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 166.  Salomon-Bajxac v. Attorney General, 558 Fed. App’x. 160 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  See Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N. Dec. 269 (1975) (holding that involuntary 
manslaughters are not crimes involving moral turpitude); Matter of Lopez, 13 I. & N. Dec. 725 
(1971); Matter v. B—, 4 I. & N. Dec. 493 (1951) (citing Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 
(W.D.N.Y. 1929)). 
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statute requires “recklessness”—that is, conscious disregard of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that someone may be killed by the 
actor’s conduct. If, on the other hand, the statute requires only 
“criminal negligence,” then it does not qualify. 
In Matter of Franklin, the petitioner was convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter for recklessly killing her daughter.170 She argued that 
involuntary manslaughter is per se not a CIMT. The BIA rejected that 
argument, instead insisting that killings done with “conscious disregard 
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk” (which is the definition of 
“reckless”) could involve moral turpitude.171 Because the statute under 
which Franklin had been convicted defined involuntary manslaughter 
on the basis of recklessness, the BIA upheld the finding of CIMT. 
“Mindful that moral turpitude is a nebulous concept and there is ample 
room for differing definitions of the term,” an Eighth Circuit panel 
affirmed, finding the BIA’s interpretation not unreasonable.172 
The BIA’s view on involuntary manslaughter changed in Matter of 
Medina.173 In Matter of Szegedi174 and Matter of Gantus-Bobadilla,175 
the BIA had previously held that criminally reckless conduct did not 
involve moral turpitude. In Medina, the Board reconsidered that view 
based on the notion that reckless conduct necessarily involves a 
“willingness to commit the act in disregard of the perceived risk.”176 
Furthermore, the actor must be “actually aware” of the risk, without 
regard to any sort of evil state of mind.177 Thus, where a jurisdiction 
requires recklessness for an involuntary manslaughter conviction, it 
qualifies for CIMT. Where a jurisdiction requires only criminal 
negligence for involuntary manslaughter, it may not. 
f. Sex crimes 
Whether certain sex crimes involve moral turpitude has also caused 
controversy over the years. Forcible rape, sexual battery, and 
prostitution have been unequivocally held to involve moral turpitude, 
while indecent exposure and sex crimes involving children have, 
 
 170.  20 I. & N. Dec. 867 (BIA 1994). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 173.  See 15 I. & N.. Dec. 611 (1976) (holding that moral turpitude can lie in criminally reckless 
conduct); See also Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I. & N.. Dec. 111 (BIA 1981) (holding that criminally 
reckless conduct can be the basis for being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude). 
 174.  10 I. & N.. Dec. 28 (1962). 
 175.  13 I. & N. Dec. 777 (1971). 
 176.  15 I. & N.. Dec. 611, at 614. 
 177.  Id. 
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surprisingly, not produced as clear-cut of results. There are relatively 
few cases addressing the question of whether forcible rape is a crime 
involving moral turpitude, probably because the matter is so clear.178 
One California Court of Appeal, surprised to find no California case 
holding forcible rape as a crime involving moral turpitude,179 stated, 
While it may be suggested that the definition of moral turpitude 
may depend on the state of public morals, and that it may vary 
according to the community and the times, it never has been 
suggested that our public morality has sunk so low as to 
countenance the singularly depraved act of rape.180 
Sexual battery and indecent assault have also been held by the 
Ninth and Third Circuits respectively to categorically involve moral 
turpitude.181 In holding sexual battery to involve moral turpitude, the 
Ninth Circuit relied on the specific intent necessary to commit the 
crime.182 This evil intent, the court held, rises to the level necessary for 
a crime to be considered morally turpitudinous.183 In contrast, the Third 
Circuit in Mehboob v. Attorney General held a conviction for indecent 
assault to involve moral turpitude, despite the fact that the offense did 
not have an intent requirement.184 This, the court reasoned, was because 
some sex crimes are strict liability crimes because they are so contrary 
to morality.185 
Additionally, prostitution, solicitation of prostitution, and 
pandering have all been held to be CIMTs.186 The BIA has held that 
prostitution always involves moral turpitude because it is “inherently 
 
 178.  See, e.g., Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 179.  “Most of the cases involve statutory rape or attempted rape, rather than an actual 
forcible rape (as to which, like first degree murder, it would appear futile to argue that no ‘moral 
turpitude’ was involved).” People v. Mazza, 175 Cal. App. 3d 838, 843 (Cal. 1985) (citing 23 A.L.R. 
Fed. 480, 567 (1975)). 
 180.  Id. at 843; See also People v. McCullar, 171 Cal. App. 3d 485 (Cal. 1985); Navarro-Lopez 
v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) for further 
discussion. 
 181.  Gonzalez-Cervantes v. Holder, 709 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 2013); Mehboob v. Attorney 
General, 549 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 182.  Gonzalez-Cervantes, 709 F.3d at 1270. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  549 F.3d at 279. 
 185.  Id. at 274. 
 186.  Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012); In the Matter of W, 4 I. & N. Dec. 401 
(BIA 1951); Florentino-Francisco v. Lynch, 611 F. App’x 936 (10th Cir. 2015); Matter of Lambert, 
11 I. & N. Dec. 340 (BIA 1965); Matter of A-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1953); In the Matter of S—
— L——, 3 I. & N. Dec. 396 (BIA 1948); In the Matter of P——, 3 I. & N. Dec. 20 (BIA 1947); 
People v. Jaimez, 184 Cal. App. 3d 146 (Cal. App. 1986). 
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base, vile, and depraved.”187 Because the solicitation of the act is no less 
base, vile, and depraved than the actual act itself, this holding has been 
extended to solicitation of prostitution and pandering as well.188 The 
solicitation is a precursor and enabler to the act and, therefore, just as 
morally turpitudinous.189  
Convictions for indecent exposure and public lewdness have 
involved more complicated and less consistent analyses regarding 
whether they involve moral turpitude. The BIA has held that indecent 
exposure involves moral turpitude when there is lewd intent.190 The 
Fifth Circuit later held that no moral turpitude could be found in a 
conviction where the statute did not contain the word “lewd” or require 
an intent to “direct attention to one’s genitals,”191 despite the fact that 
the conviction was for “public lewdness.”192 Complicating matters, the 
Ninth Circuit has held that moral turpitude is not involved in indecent 
exposure.193 Contrary to the BIA and Fifth Circuit’s holdings that 
lewdness is an essential element for an indecent exposure conviction to 
involve moral turpitude, the Ninth Circuit held a conviction not to 
qualify as CIMT where the statute did include a requirement of willful 
and lewd intent.194 The court noted that a nude dancer or someone who 
grabbed his genitals as an insult during a road rage incident could be 
convicted under the statute.195 Because neither of these acts involves 
moral turpitude, the court held that the statute did not categorically 
involve moral turpitude.196 Although inappropriate and offensive, these 
acts are not “base, vile, and depraved,” nor do they shock the 
conscience.197 
 
 187.  In the Matter of W, 4 I. & N. Dec. 401 (BIA 1951); see also Florentino-Francisco v. 
Lynch, 611 F. App’x 936 (10th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the BIA has long viewed prostitution 
as involving moral turpitude). 
 188.  Rohit, 670 F.3d at 1090–91. 
 189.  Id.; see also Matter of Lambert, 11 I. & N. Dec. 340 (holding that a defendant who 
provided rooms for use for prostitution was guilty of moral turpitude); Matter of A-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 
546; In the Matter of P——, 3 I. & N. Dec. 20. 
 190.  Matter of Medina, 26 I. & N. Dec. 79 (BIA 2013). 
 191.  Cisneros-Guerrerro v. Holder, 774 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 192.  Id. at 1058. 
 193.  Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 194.  “Every person who willfully and lewdly [e]xposes his person, or the private parts thereof, 
in any public place, or in any place where there are present other persons to be offended or 
annoyed thereby . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. at 1130. 
 195.  Id. at 1135–1139. 
 196.  Id. at 1138. 
 197.  Id. 
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Further inconsistencies are found in sex crimes involving minors 
and children. Statutory rape has been held by the BIA and Eighth 
Circuit to be morally turpitudinous.198 Further, “carnal knowledge of a 
female 15 years of age” has held by the Fourth Circuit to involve “moral 
turpitude per se.”199 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held statutory 
rape not to constitute a CIMT.200 
Furthermore, “endangering the welfare of a child through sexual 
conduct,”201 “lewd and lascivious conduct toward a child,”202 
“communicating with a minor for immoral purposes,”203 and 
“encouraging or contributing to deprivation or delinquency of a 
minor”204 were all found to be crimes involving moral turpitude. This 
contrasts with two of the more surprising CIMT rulings—that child 
annoyance205 and child molestation206 do not involve moral turpitude. 
Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey held that the crime of annoying or 
molesting a child was not a CIMT, despite the fact that the statute 
required that the annoyance or molestation be “motivated by an 
unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the victim.”207 
g. Failure to register as a sex offender 
The BIA has taken the  position that failure to register as a sex 
offender can constitute a CIMT. In In re Tobar-Lobo, the petitioner had 
been convicted under the California Sex Offender Registration Act.208 
One of the essential elements of this offense was that the convict be 
apprised of the obligation to register as a sex offender. The BIA held 
that this was a CIMT.209 The federal courts of appeals, however, have 
not agreed and have been uniform in rejecting failure to register as a 
sex offender as a CIMT. 
 
 198.  Matter of Dingena, 11 I. & N. Dec. 723 (BIA 1966); In the Matter of M——, 2 I. & N. 
Dec. 17 (BIA 1944; In the Matter of S——, 2 I. & N. Dec. 553 (BIA 1946); Marciano v. INS, 450 
F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971). 
 199.  Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064 (4th Cir. 1976). 
 200.  Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 201.  Amaya v. Attorney General, 189 F. App’x 130 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 202.  Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1949). 
 203.  Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 204.  Sheikh v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 205.  Rodriguez-Macias v. Mukasey, 286 F. App’x 984 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 206.  Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  24 I. & N. Dec. 143 (BIA 2007). 
 209.  Id. at 146. 
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In Efagene v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit was faced with a conviction 
for failure to register as a sex offender under Colorado law.210 The court 
held that this was not a CIMT for two reasons. First, and most 
importantly, failure to register is merely a regulatory offense of 
omission, not a crime malum in se.211 Second, the court criticized the 
BIA’s reasoning in Tobar-Lobo because it was incapable of any 
principled stopping place. “Any obligation on which society has placed 
a threat of imprisonment for failure to comply can be characterized as 
‘too important not to heed,’ as the BIA said of the obligation to register 
as a sex offender.”212 “Moreover, as the dissent in Tobar-Lobo correctly 
pointed out, ‘the breach of any and every law can be said to violate the 
duties owed between persons or to society in general.’”213 
Another Court of Appeals has highlighted the lack of mens rea 
required in the crime of failure to register as a sex offender. In 
Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, because the statute was one of strict 
liability for any failure to register by the deadline or update a current 
registration, it had no requirement for “willfulness or evil intent.”214 
This scienter requirement was held to be a requirement for a finding of 
moral turpitude, and thus, the statute did not constitute one 
criminalizing CIMTs.215 Precedent from other circuits lines up with 
Plasencia-Ayala.216 
h. Child abuse and child abandonment 
Further complicating the analysis are crimes involving child 
abandonment and child abuse, which have created inconsistent rulings. 
The BIA held that child abandonment involves moral turpitude, but 
this holding has not been followed by the Fifth Circuit. In In re Matter 
of S——, the BIA held that a conviction under a New York statute 
prohibiting the willful abandonment of a child in destitute 
circumstances and the failure to provide necessary food, clothing, or 
shelter a felony, was a crime involving moral turpitude.217 The BIA 
 
 210.  642 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2011); See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5. 
 211.  Efagene, 642 F.3d at 921–25. 
 212.  Id. at 925. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  516 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds, Marmolejo-Campos v. 
Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 215.  516 F.3d at 747. 
 216.  Totimeh v. Atty Gen., 666 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (MINN. STAT. § 243.166 was not 
CIMT); Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885 (4th Cir. 2014) (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-472.1 was not 
CIMT). 
 217.  2 I. & N. Dec. 553 (BIA 1946). 
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contrasted this statute with others from Ohio, California, Missouri, and 
Canada that had been held not to involve moral turpitude.218 The Ohio 
and California statutes did not require that the child be left in destitute 
circumstances.219 The Missouri statute allowed for a conviction if the 
child had been abandoned or if the defendant had failed to provide for 
the child, but did not require both elements.220 Finally, the Canadian 
statute did not require abandonment or any element of willfulness.221 
In contrast, the New York statute required a finding of 1) willfulness, 2) 
leaving the child in destitute circumstances, and 3) failing provide food, 
clothing, or shelter.222 Thus, the BIA held that the combination of all 
three elements brought the statute to the level of involving moral 
turpitude.223 
The Fifth Circuit came to a contrary ruling regarding a Texas statute 
criminalizing child abandonment.224 The court justified this with a least 
culpable conduct analysis of the statute. The statute had been construed 
to require proof that the offender knew that he was leaving the child in 
a place without an adequate caretaker, but not that the offender knew 
that the circumstances would expose the child to an unreasonable risk 
of harm.225 The minimum level of culpability that could result, then, was 
“an act involving only negligence in temporarily leaving a child, with 
the intent to return, in a situation of unreasonable risk, but without 
harm to the child.”226 Because the statute did not require a finding of 
willful or intentional leaving of the child in destitute circumstances, the 
crime at hand was not one involving moral turpitude. Thus, it seems that 
a conviction for child abandonment will be found to involve moral 
turpitude if it involves intentionally leaving a child in potentially 
harmful, destitute circumstances, but not if the statute does not require 
this element of willfulness. 
In addition to the cases involving child abandonment, the Eleventh 
Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Fifth Circuit have found that child abuse is 
a crime involving moral turpitude. In a 1969 Ninth Circuit case, 
Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, the defendant had been charged in 
 
 218.  Id. at 555. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. at 556. 
 224.  Rodriguez-Castro v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 225.  Id. at 321. 
 226.  Id. at 322. 
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California for “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously mak[ing] an assault 
and inflict[ing] a corporal injury” upon her minor son.227 With limited 
discussion, the court held that a conviction under the statute “is so 
offensive to American ethics that the fact that it was done purposely or 
willingly (the California definition of ‘willful’) ends debate on whether 
moral turpitude was involved.”228 Thus, the element of willfulness 
regarding the injury inflicted was the factor which caused the crime to 
be one involving moral turpitude. 
In contrast, a 2005 Ninth Circuit case contains dicta indicating that 
a challenge to a conviction for aggravated child abuse under the same 
statute in Guerrero de Nodahl is still open.229 There, the court remanded 
the case for a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel on the 
grounds that the defendant’s counsel should have appealed the ruling 
that her conviction for aggravated child abuse was a CIMT.230 The court 
stated that, under the modified categorical approach, there was no 
indication from the record that the defendant’s offense was willful or 
that the child actually suffered injury from the offense.231 Thus, in order 
for a charge of aggravated child abuse to properly be considered a 
crime involving moral turpitude, there needs to be proof of an element 
of willfulness and of actual injury to the victim. 
The Eleventh Circuit held that a conviction for aggravated child 
abuse was a crime involving moral turpitude, based on Guerrero de 
Nodahl.232 With little discussion, and without referring to the record of 
conviction, the court concluded that “the inherent nature of the crime 
of aggravated child abuse” was enough to conclude that the defendant 
had committed a crime involving moral turpitude and was therefore 
inadmissible.233 Interestingly, the Florida statute under which the 
defendant was convicted contained three subsections: 
(a) “Aggravated child abuse” occurs when a person: 
1. commits aggravated battery on a child; 
2. willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully 
cages a child; or 
 
 227.  407 F.2d 1405, 1405–06 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 228.  Id. at 1406–07. 
 229.  Padernal-Nye v. Gonzales, 133 F. App’x 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Garcia v. Attorney General of U.S., 329 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F.2d 1405, 1406–07 (9th Cir. 1969)). 
 233.  Id. 
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3. Knowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing causes great 
bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to 
the child.234 
Though the court did not specify under which subsection the 
defendant was convicted, the defendant was likely convicted under 
subsection (1) because the court also stated that the defendant was 
convicted of aggravated battery. The Florida statute for aggravated 
battery stated: 
(1)(a) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing 
battery: 
1. intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent 
disability, or permanent disfigurement; or 
2. Uses a deadly weapon.235 
Though a conviction for aggravated child abuse, based on 
aggravated battery under subsection (1), would satisfy the Ninth 
Circuit’s requirement for willfulness, a conviction under subsection (2) 
would not. Because the court did not specify the subsection under 
which the defendant was convicted or refer to the record of conviction, 
it is unclear whether the element of willfulness was satisfied in this case. 
The court also did not advert to willfulness as a necessary feature to 
qualify aggravated child abuse as a CIMT. 
Another Fifth Circuit case similarly held that a conviction for 
aggravated child abuse was a crime involving moral turpitude without 
referring to willfulness.236 In a brief opinion, the court stated only that 
“our review of the relevant Florida statutes indicates that the BIA’s 
determination that Jimenez-Zuniga’s conviction for aggravated child 
abuse constituted a CIMT was reasonable.”237 
 
 234.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.03(1)(a) (2017). 
 235.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.045(1)(a) (2017). 
 236.  Jimenez-Zuniga v. Mukasey, 305 F. App’x 208, 209–10 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 237.  Id. at 210; the statute at issue there stated: 
 “Any person who knows or reasonably should know that a person is an elder or 
dependent adult and who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great 
bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any elder or dependent adult to suffer, 
or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or 
custody of any elder or dependent adult, willfully causes or permits the person or health 
of the elder or dependent adult to be injured, or willfully causes or permits the elder or 
dependent adult to be placed in a situation in which his or her person or health is 
endangered, is punishable by imprisonment. . . .” 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 368(b)(1) (West 2011). 
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In an interesting contrast, the Ninth Circuit overturned a BIA 
holding that elder abuse categorically involved moral turpitude.238 The 
court found the statute to be divisible into multiple crimes, some of 
which involved moral turpitude and some of which did not.239 Without 
explaining which of the divisible crimes involved moral turpitude and 
which did not, the court remanded the case to the BIA to address 
whether the specific conviction was a CIMT.240 It is difficult to 
determine which of the crimes from the statute the court determined 
not to involve moral turpitude, particularly since there seems to be an 
element of willfulness involved in any conviction under the statute. 
i. Theft 
Theft convictions, on the surface, appear to be clear-cut in regards 
to whether they constitute CIMTs. Because theft is considered a 
fraudulent act, it has long been held to involve moral turpitude. To a 
layperson it would seem that petty theft lacks the requisite seriousness 
to be considered a crime involving moral turpitude, yet the courts have 
found that “since the elements of petty theft are the same as theft in 
general, the element of moral turpitude would continue to be present 
whether the theft be petty or grand.”241 Thus, courts have long held that 
petty theft is a CIMT.242 The Seventh Circuit stated that “Theft has 
always been held to involve moral turpitude, regardless of the sentence 
imposed or the amount stolen.”243 According to the BIA, “Burglary and 
theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, are crimes involving moral 
turpitude.”244 “It is well settled that theft or larceny, whether grand or 
petty, has always been held to involve moral turpitude,”245 the BIA 
stated in a different case, and in yet another, it stated, “The fact that the 
theft may have been petty is immaterial to the question of whether or 
not it involved moral turpitude.”246 Thus, due to the nature of theft itself, 
the seriousness afforded to the conviction by the law is not given the 
same weight for immigration purposes. The mother who steals bread 
for her family is considered as deportable as the career criminal who 
steals vehicles for profit. 
 
 238.  Singh v. Holder, 414 F. App’x 909, 910 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 239.  Id. at 910. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  U.S. v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 242.  Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
 243.  Soetarto v. INS, 516 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 244.  In re De La Nues, 18 I. & N. Dec. 140, 145 (BIA 1981). 
 245.  In re Scarpulla 15 I. & N. Dec. 139, 140–41 (BIA 1974). 
 246.  Matter of Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973). 
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In theft cases, for CIMT purposes, the BIA and courts have focused 
on the intent to permanently deprive.247 The BIA has held repeatedly 
that a theft offense is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude if the 
statute of conviction is broad enough to criminalize a taking with intent 
to deprive the owner of his property only temporarily.248 However, this 
seemingly clear line requiring the permanent taking of property for a 
theft offense to be a CIMT becomes blurred when juxtaposed with the 
BIA’s holding that the “specific intent [to permanently deprive] can be 
presumed whenever one unlawfully takes, or attempts to take, the 
property of another.”249 Allowing courts to make this presumption 
converts every taking into a CIMT whether the intent to deprive was 
permanent or temporary. With the law in such a state, it is entirely up 
to the discretion of prosecutors and judges which theft convictions will 
be determined CIMT and which will not. 
III. THE LAW OF VAGUENESS 
Johnson v. United States250 is the latest word from the U.S. Supreme 
Court on vagueness and thereby becomes the focal point for any 
subsequent vagueness analysis. It is nonetheless worth a brief look at 
the history of vagueness as a constitutional doctrine.251 
A. Origins 
Interestingly, the doctrine was innovated at least in part to protect 
the interests of whites as against people of color. In the Reconstruction-
era case United States v. Reese,252 the federal government brought 
 
 247.  “Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a 
permanent taking is intended.” Id. 
 248.  See, e.g., In re Jurado–Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29, 33 (BIA 2006); Matter of Grazley, 
14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973) (“Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to involve 
moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended.”); In the Matter of P, 2 I. & N. Dec. 
887 (B.I.A.1947) (holding that offenses like joy riding are not morally turpitudinous because they 
do not involve the intent to deprive the owner of the property permanently); Matter of H, 2 I. & 
N. Dec. 864, 865 (BIA 1947) (“[T]he element which must exist before the crime of theft or stealing 
is deemed one involving moral turpitude is that the offense must be one which involves a 
permanent taking as distinguished from a temporary one”). 
 249.  Matter of V-Z-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1338, 1350 (BIA 2000). 
 250.  135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 251.  Although there are many law review articles on vagueness, they tend to focus exclusively 
on applications of vagueness analysis to particular statutes or on the relationship of vagueness to 
other constitutional doctrines. The most helpful general article on vagueness is Andrew E. 
Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
279 (2003). The locus classicus, now somewhat dated, is Anthony Amsterdam’s student note, The 
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). 
 252.  92 U.S. 214 (1875). 
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criminal charges against Kentucky officials for discriminating against a 
black voter. The Court struck down the federal criminal statute on the 
ground that, literally construed, it authorized punishment for more 
than just race discrimination. This overbreadth rendered the statute not 
“appropriate legislation” to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.253 In so 
holding, the Court stated, “Laws which prohibit the doing of things, and 
provide a punishment for their violation, should not have a double 
meaning.”254 “If the legislature undertakes to define by statute a new 
offense,” continued the Court, “and provides for its punishment, it 
should express its will in language that need not deceive the common 
mind. Every man should be able to know with certainty when he is 
committing a crime.”255 Putting aside the obvious racial dynamic 
underlying this case, Reese confirms that the law of vagueness 
developed as a response to the advent and spread of malum prohibitum 
offenses. A crime malum in se gave notice of its illegality by its obvious 
immorality; a crime malum prohibitum did not. 
Another example of a malum prohibitum offense is a criminal 
antitrust statute. In International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 
the defendant corporation was prosecuted and fined for violating state 
price-fixing conspiracy laws.256 Justice Holmes’ opinion reversing the 
convictions is worth excerpting because it presages Johnson: 
[F]or it shows how impossible it is to think away the principal facts 
of the case as it exists, and say what would have been the price in an 
imaginary world. . . . The reason is not the general uncertainties of a 
jury trial, but that the elements necessary to determine the 
imaginary ideal are uncertain both in nature and degree of effect to 
the acutest commercial mind. 
We regard this decision as consistent with Nash v. United States [229 
U.S. 373 (1913)] in which it was held that a criminal law is not 
unconstitutional merely because it throws upon men the risk of 
rightly estimating a matter of degree — what is an undue restraint 
of trade. That deals with the actual, not with an imaginary condition 
other than the facts. . . . To compel them to guess, on peril of 
indictment, what the community would have given for them if the 
continually changing conditions were other than they are, to an 
uncertain extent; to divine prophetically what the reaction of only 
partially determinate facts would be upon the imaginations and 
 
 253.  Id. at 221–22. 
 254.  Id. at 220. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  234 U.S. 216 (1914). 
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desires of purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind does not 
possess.257 
International Harvester is not on all fours with Johnson, as it concerns 
the difficulty of predicting the imaginings of purchasers, not the 
imaginings of judges. Still, International Harvester creates an 
intellectual template for Johnson by finding constitutional fault with a 
criminal statute for forcing citizens to gauge the criminality of their 
contemplated acts on a hypothetical, rather than factual, predicate. As 
with Johnson, the ultimate problem was lack of sufficient notice. 
Eventually, the Court’s vagueness analysis leaped from statutes 
gauging criminality based on hypothetical facts to statutes that were 
simply too textually open-ended in their liability standards. In United 
States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., the defendant company was punished 
under a criminal rate-fixing statute that “made unlawful for any person 
willfully . . . to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in 
handling or dealing in or with any necessaries. . . .”258 Chief Justice 
White stated that the provision “leaves open . . . the widest conceivable 
inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which 
no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against.”259 
In Connally v. General Construction Co., the defendant company 
had been punished for violating a state minimum-wage law decreeing, 
“[N]ot less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where 
the work is performed shall be paid . . . .”260 The Court found the statute 
unconstitutionally vague, stressing that the provision “presents a 
double uncertainty.”261 The Court was particularly concerned that the 
word “‘neighborhood’ is quite as susceptible of variation as the word 
‘locality.’ Both terms are elastic . . . .”262 The “double uncertainty” 
found fatal in Connolly parallels the dynamic of uncertainty-
compounding-uncertainty in the residual clause of the statute struck 
down in Johnson. 
The vagueness doctrine’s next leap forward came toward the end of 
the Warren Court, which generally distrusted broad discretion in law 
enforcement. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,263 the Court held 
 
 257.  Id. at 223–24 (emphasis added). 
 258.  255 U.S. 81, 89 (1920). 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  269 U.S. 385, 388 (1926). 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  405 U.S. 156 (1969). 
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a loitering ordinance void for vagueness “both in the sense that it fails 
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, and because it 
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.”264 Arbitrary 
enforcement as a ground for vagueness was also apparent in Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, which, in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a 
municipal anti-noise ordinance, noted that the law “contains no broad 
invitation to subjective or discriminatory enforcement.”265 “As always, 
enforcement requires the exercise of some degree of police judgment, 
but, as confined, that degree of judgment here is permissible.”266 
It became clear in Kolender v. Lawson267 that the notice and 
arbitrary enforcement prongs of the vagueness doctrine constituted 
independently sufficient reasons for finding a criminal law 
unconstitutional. Striking down a California loitering statute, Justice 
O’Connor stated the general rule for vagueness as follows: “[T]he void-
for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”268 The portion 
of the statute that required an individual to produce “credible and 
reliable” identification upon police demand failed the second prong of 
that rule. “[T]he statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands 
of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute 
and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable 
cause to arrest.”269 The majority continued: “An individual, whom 
police may think is suspicious but do not have probable cause to believe 
has committed a crime, is entitled to continue to walk the public streets 
‘only at the whim of any police officer’ who happens to stop that 
individual under” the ordinance.270 The focus on arbitrary enforcement 
continued into the Rehnquist Court when, in City of Chicago v. 
Morales,271 the Court invalidated Chicago’s “Gang Congregation 
 
 264.  Id. at 162. 
 265.  408 U.S. 104, 113 (1972). 
 266.  Id. at 114. 
 267.  461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
 268.  Id. at 357, citing, inter alia, Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) 
(ordinance requiring license for retailers of marijuana paraphernalia was not vague in context of 
a pre-enforcement challenge where there was not a clear showing of the danger of arbitrary 
enforcement). 
 269.  Id. at 358. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
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Ordinance.” Because that ordinance contained no requirement of a 
harmful purpose, and because it applied to non-gang members as well 
as suspected gang members, it effectively left complete discretion to the 
police to arrest almost anyone. In the words of Justice Stevens, it 
“provide[d] absolute discretion to police officers to decide what 
activities constitute loitering.”272 
B. Johnson v. United States 
In 2012, Samuel James Johnson was indicted in federal court for 
being a convicted felon in possession of a weapon, the normal sentence 
for which is two years. The government successfully sought a 
mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years based on Johnson having 
three previous convictions for “violent felonies,” including one for 
possession of a short-barreled shotgun. The lower federal courts held 
that this mandatory minimum sentence was authorized by the “residual 
clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).273 Among other 
things, the ACCA makes it a federal crime for a convicted felon to 
possess a weapon, and sets forth greatly enhanced sentences for those 
previously convicted of “serious drug offenses” and/or “violent 
felonies.”274 
The ACCA sets forth several definitions of “violent felony,” 
including any felony that involves force; robbery, burglary, extortion, or 
use of explosives; or any other felony that poses a “serious potential 
risk of injury” to someone other than the felon himself.275 The last 
clause has come to be known as the “residual clause,” because it has a 
catch-all quality. Johnson’s possession of sawed-off shotgun conviction 
did not qualify under any of the other definitions of violent felony, so 
the lower courts held that it qualified under the residual clause. 
Johnson challenged that holding on the ground that the residual clause 
was unconstitutionally vague. In a landmark opinion by Justice Scalia 
for a 6-3 majority, the Court struck down the residual clause for 
impermissible vagueness. 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court began its analysis with 
Kolender’s statement of the rule, which had become the black-letter 
law. “Our cases establish that the Government violates this guarantee 
by taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law 
 
 272.  Id. at 61 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 457 (Ill. 1997)). 
 273.  18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012). 
 274.  Id. § 924(e)(1). 
 275.  Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). 
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so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct 
it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”276 
Without further elaboration of this rule, the Court then stated that the 
law of vagueness applies “not only to statutes defining elements of 
crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.”277 
The Court then described the so-called “categorical approach” to 
determine whether prior convictions qualify under the ACCA. 
Although the categorical approach is intellectually challenging to 
grasp, it is absolutely essential to understanding why Johnson makes 
CIMT untenable going forward, because both the residual clause of the 
ACCA and CIMT are applied categorically, not on the basis of the 
actual facts of the underlying convictions. The categorical approach by 
definition requires judging based on hypothetical, rather than actual, 
facts. This is what makes it unconstitutionally vague in both the ACCA 
residual clause and CIMT contexts. 
The pathmarking decision regarding the categorical approach is 
Taylor v. United States, in which the defendant’s alleged third strike was 
a Missouri burglary conviction.278 Burglary is enumerated in § 
924(e)(2),279 so one might think that the conviction obviously qualified. 
But the Taylor Court explained that the analysis was not so simple; the 
courts could not simply take a nominal approach to burglary—that is, 
they could not simply count the conviction as burglary because 
Missouri called it burglary.280 Every state has a different burglary 
statute, with major variations regarding which places can be 
burglarized. Congress could not have wanted all sorts of different 
statutes counted as burglary simply because the state legislatures chose 
to use that label.281 
 
 276.  Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)). 
 277.  Id. at 2557 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)). 
 278.  495 U.S. 575, 578 (1990). 
 279.  Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) states in pertinent part: 
“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of 
a firearm, knife or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for 
such a term if committed by an adult, that – is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the 
use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another . . .” 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii(emphasis added). 
 280.  See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592 (“We think that ‘burglary’ in 924(e) must have some uniform 
definition independent of the labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes.”). 
 281.  Id. at 590–91. 
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Thus, the Taylor Court adopted a generic form of burglary for 
ACCA analysis. If a state version of burglary contained all the elements 
of this generic federal target, then convictions under that statute count 
as burglary; if not, then not. But adopting a generic federal form of 
burglary quickly provoked another issue, namely, how to determine 
whether a given conviction meets the elements in the generic form. For 
example, Taylor’s generic form of burglary requires that the place of 
the burglary be a fixed structure and not a car, boat, or airplane.282 Yet 
in some states people can be convicted of “burglary” for unlawfully 
entering cars, boats, or airplanes with the intent to commit crimes 
therein. Do those convictions count? 
There are two principal methods of making that determination. 
One would be to look at the real conduct—the actual facts—underlying 
the burglary conviction. If, for example, the defendant’s lawyer 
admitted at the plea hearing that the place of the burglary was a house 
or a store, or if something else in the record showed that the place of 
the burglary was a fixed structure, then the conviction would count. In 
the real world, however, the record does not always contain competent 
evidence of the precise nature and place of the burglary, which means 
the “real conduct” or “actual facts” approach would often require mini-
trials of old convictions to determine the applicability of the ACCA.283 
Eschewing this method as impractical, the Court in Taylor instead 
adopted a categorical approach.284 With respect to burglaries, courts are 
to examine the state statute of conviction. If the statute permits 
convictions for burglaries of places other than fixed structures, then all 
convictions under that statute are categorically disqualified, even if it is 
clear that this particular burglary took place in a fixed structure. Thus, 
federal sentencing courts are not required to retry cases that are often 
from a long time ago and from a state far away. Note, however, that if 
there are no state court precedents on point (as there usually are not), 
the federal court must hypothesize one or more fact patterns to 
determine whether the statute reaches conduct beyond the relevant 
category (in Taylor, the burglary of a fixed structure). It is this need for 
judicially hypothesized facts, rather than the actual facts of the 
 
 282.  Id. at 599 (“building or structure”). 
 283.  Id. at 601; see also Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013) (explaining 
how the categorical approach “avoids the Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from 
sentencing courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to juries”). 
 284.  Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590. 
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underlying convictions, that makes CIMT so vulnerable to a vagueness 
challenge. 
The exact mode of categorical approach employed in Taylor was 
not available to the courts in residual clause cases, because the residual 
clause enumerates no felonies, such as burglary or extortion. It is 
impossible to analyze the formal elements of statutes unless one knows 
the precise statutes to be analyzed. The whole point of a residual clause 
is not to limit coverage; hence, the analytical mode of scrutinizing 
formal elements to determine the “minimum” or “least culpable” 
conduct required for a conviction was not possible. In Taylor, that 
minimum or least culpable conduct would be burglarizing something 
other than a fixed structure. 
Therefore, if the residual clause were to be treated on a categorical 
basis, it would have to be on an “ordinary or typical commission” 
approach. That is, courts would have to determine what the ordinary 
commission of the felony in question looks like. What facts underlie the 
ordinary commission of driving under the influence? What facts 
underlie the ordinary commission of attempted burglary? What facts 
underlie the ordinary commission of using a motor vehicle to elude a 
police officer? Once such hypothetical facts were determined, they 
could be tested for the “serious potential risk” of injury. 
There is, however, an inherent arbitrariness to imagining the 
ordinary commissions of felonies. In James v. United States, where the 
question was whether attempted burglary in Florida posed a serious 
potential risk of injury, the Court said yes, reasoning that the ordinary 
attempted burglary may be more dangerous than the ordinary 
completed burglary because the typical attempted burglary that is 
actually prosecuted has ended in “confrontation between the burglar 
and a third party.”285 In Chambers v. United States, the felony at issue 
was failure to report to a penal institution under Illinois law.286 The 
majority concluded that this felony did not fall within the residual 
clause, in large part because “an individual who fails to report would 
seem unlikely, not likely, to call attention to his whereabouts by 
simultaneously engaging in additional violent and unlawful 
conduct.”287 In Sykes v. United States, the felony at issue was vehicular 
 
 285.  550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007). 
 286.  555 U.S. 122, 127 (2009). 
 287.  Id. at 128. 
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flight from a police officer.288 The Court imagined the following 
scenario as typical: 
It is well known that when offenders use motor vehicles as their 
means of escape they create serious potential risks of physical injury 
to others. Flight from a law enforcement officer invites, even 
demands, pursuit. As that pursuit continues, the risk of an accident 
accumulates. And having chosen to flee, and thereby commit a 
crime, the perpetrator has all the more reason to seek to avoid 
capture.289 
Statistics could have made the “ordinary commission” approach 
less arbitrary, and in fact the Court used them where available.290 But 
availability proved problematic. The Court’s data came from multiple 
sources with different gathering methodologies.291 In dissent, Justice 
Scalia derided this eclectic approach to statistics: “The Court does not 
reveal why it chose one dataset over another. In sum, our statistical 
analysis in ACCA cases is untested judicial factfinding masquerading 
as statutory interpretation.”292 The available data were too limited to 
solve the arbitrariness issue—which a majority of the justices realized 
in Johnson. 293 
In his Johnson majority opinion, Justice Scalia carefully explained 
that the residual clause was not vague merely because “serious 
potential risk” feels too subjective or open-ended. The government 
cited dozens of state and federal statutes using similar locutions: 
“substantial risk,” “grave risk,” and “unreasonable risk.”294 The 
 
 288.  564 U.S. 1 (2011). 
 289.  Id. at 10. 
 290.  See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 128–30 (2009) (using statistics in its 
analysis); Sykes, 564 U.S. at 10 (using statistics in its analysis). 
 291.  The Sykes Court relied on the following statistical sources: NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS 
& ANALYSIS, “FATALITIES IN MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC CRASHES INVOLVING POLICE IN 
PURSUIT” (2010); INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, C. LUM & G. FACHNER, “POLICE PURSUITS 
IN AN AGE OF INNOVATION AND REFORM” (2008); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SHANNON 
CATALANO, “VICTIMIZATION DURING HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY” (Sept. 2010); U.S. FIRE 
ADMIN. “METHODOLOGY USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOPICAL FIRE RESEARCH 
SERIES”, http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/tfrs/methodology.pdf (visited by the Court June 
3, 2011). 564 U.S. at 11–20. 
 292.  Sykes, 564 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 293.  Justice Alito alone would have saved the residual clause from vagueness by switching to 
an actual facts approach. He did not explain how such an approach could be carried out without 
the need of retrying the facts underlying prior convictions in many of the cases. Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2578 (2015)(Alito, J., dissenting). 
 294.  Supplemental Brief for the United States at 36, Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015) (No. 13-7120), 2015 WL 1284964 at *22. See also the statutes cited in the appendix of the 
brief.  
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government’s implication was clear: if the Court  held that the residual 
clause was unconstitutionally vague, then these similarly worded 
statutes would also be unconstitutional. 
But the majority had a ready answer. The residual clause was vague 
because, given the categorical approach, it hinged the concept of risk 
onto hypothetical facts. It was not vague because the concept of risk is 
inherently vague; it was vague because the residual clause, viewed 
through the “ordinary commission” lens, required judges to imagine a 
set of facts and then to determine whether that imagined set of facts 
presented a serious risk of injury. 
In the first place, the residual clause leaves grave uncertainty about 
how to estimate the risk posed by a crime. It ties the judicial assessment 
of risk to a judicially imagined ‘“ordinary case”‘ of a crime, not to real-
world facts or statutory elements. How does one go about deciding 
what kind of conduct the “ordinary case” of a crime involves?295 
At the same time, the Court continued, the residual clause leaves 
uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a 
violent felony. The court pointed out the difficulty and inherent 
imprecision in applying a standard requiring the assessment of risk to 
“judge-imagined abstraction.”296 
The Court cited two additional factors that made the residual clause 
vague. First, by asking whether the crime otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk, the residual clause forced courts 
to interpret “serious potential risk” in light of the four enumerated 
crimes—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of 
explosives.297 These offenses are “far from clear in respect to the degree 
of risk each poses.”298 Second, the majority cited the Court’s own 
interpretive struggles with the residual clause: 
This Court has acknowledged that the failure of “persistent efforts 
. . . to establish a standard” can provide evidence of vagueness. Here, 
this Court’s repeated attempts and repeated failures to craft a 
principled and objective standard out of the residual clause confirm 
its hopeless indeterminacy. 
* * * 
 
 295.  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 296.  Id. at 2558. 
 297.  Id. at 2557. 
 298.  Id. at 2558, citing to Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008). 
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It has been said that the life of the law is experience. Nine years’ 
experience trying to derive meaning from the residual clause 
convinces us that we have embarked upon a failed enterprise.299 
Thus, Johnson’s vagueness analysis turns on one main factor and 
two less important ones. The main factor is the intersection of risk and 
hypothetical facts. The less important factors are: (1) juxtaposition to 
enumerated felonies, inviting comparison; and (2) repeated judicial 
failures to craft a principled and objective standard. 
IV. THE VAGUENESS DOCTRINE IN IMMIGRATION CASES 
A. Heightened Scrutiny for Immigration 
In the 1951 decision Jordan v. De George,300 the Court held that 
deportation should be treated as a criminal penalty for constitutional 
purposes, but that the “moral turpitude” standard was nevertheless not 
void for vagueness, at least as applied to a federal liquor tax fraud 
statute.301 Thus, De George contains two distinct holdings: one 
concerning the appropriate level of scrutiny for a vagueness challenge 
in immigration proceedings, the other on the merits of the vagueness 
challenge to a particular statute.302 This section explains why the first 
holding is not only still good law, but indeed has been bolstered by the 
recent landmark Supreme Court decision, Padilla v. Kentucky.303 The 
Court should repudiate the second holding, based not only on Justice 
Jackson’s De George dissent critiquing CIMT (discussed earlier), but 
also on Johnson. 
 
 299.  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (citation omitted). 
 300.  341 U.S. 223 (1951). 
 301.  Id. at 231–32. 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010). We believe that De George’s holding that immigration 
proceedings should be subjected to heightened scrutiny is also supported, albeit obliquely, by an 
older Supreme Court decision, Yamataya v. United States, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). There, the Court 
held that administrative officers may not disregard the fundamental principles of due process in 
making final decisions about whether a non-citizen may remain in the United States. The 
Yamataya Court stated: 
“[I]t is not competent for the Secretary of the Treasury or any executive officer, at any 
time within the year limited by the statute, arbitrarily to cause an alien who has entered 
the country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its 
population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported 
without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to 
be and remain in the United States.” 
Id. at 100. 
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In vagueness analysis, whether deportation proceedings are 
considered civil or quasi-criminal determines the appropriate level of 
constitutional scrutiny. Even if CIMT would survive vagueness analysis 
under a deferential rational basis review, it would not survive under 
heightened scrutiny. Because De George, bolstered by Padilla, compels 
heightened scrutiny, the question of whether CIMT would survive 
rational basis scrutiny is moot. 
i. Jordan v. De George 
In 1889, the Supreme Court declared immigration removal 
proceedings to be of a civil, not criminal, nature.304 Even deportation 
proceedings used to expel lawful permanent residents were held four 
years later to be of a civil nature.305 Since then, however, recognizing 
that deportation and removal proceedings are “uniquely difficult to 
classify” and “intimately related to the criminal process,”306 the Court 
has eroded these early precedents. 
The greatest eroding force is the Court’s 1951 decision in De 
George.307 The majority opinion explains why immigration may not 
simply be treated as a civil matter, which would subject it to deferential 
rational basis review.308 
In De George, an Italian immigrant was charged with possessing 
alcohol “with intent to sell it in fraud of law and evade the tax thereon” 
and removing and concealing liquor “with intent to defraud the United 
States of the tax thereon.”309 De George was convicted, served his 
prison sentence, and then returned to unlawful activities. He was 
thereby charged with “unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully defraud[ing] 
the United States of tax on distilled spirits.”310 He was again found 
guilty of these crimes.311 Deportation proceedings began against him 
under the theory that his crimes were crimes involving moral turpitude. 
The BIA determined that the respondent’s crimes involved moral 
turpitude and he was ordered deported, but the Seventh Circuit 
reversed and ordered De George discharged.312 The Seventh Circuit 
 
 304.  Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 305.  Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 306.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 357. 
 307.  341 U.S. 223 (1951). 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. at 224. 
 310.  Id. at 224–25. 
 311.  Id. at 225. 
 312.  Id.; Brief of Petitioner, Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (No. 348), 1951 WL 
82136 at *5–6. 
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ruled that the INA intended only crimes of violence and “crimes which 
are commonly thought of as involving baseness, vileness or depravity” 
to be considered CIMTs.313 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
the issue of whether evading a liquor tax constitutes a crime involving 
moral turpitude.314 
De George argued that the Committee of Immigration and 
Naturalization of the House of Representatives,315 in which the term 
moral turpitude was discussed, intended for the term to encompass 
only crimes of violence. He argued that including the words “involving 
moral turpitude” indicated that Congress was attempting to limit the 
class of deportable aliens. Additionally, he argued that selling liquor to 
evade a tax is not “base, vile, or depraved,” which were the descriptors 
most frequently used to define moral turpitude.316 
The State of Kentucky argued that moral turpitude was not clearly 
defined, and that there was no exact test to determine whether specific 
offenses involve moral turpitude.317 Rather, the offenses must be 
measured against the moral standards of society.318 Given that the 
evasion of liquor tax was a direct result of “the gangsters of the 
prohibition era,” Kentucky argued that the offenses represented 
evidence of a criminal enterprise. The crime in question was not one 
that was committed occasionally or accidentally, but represented 
“organized lawlessness, thriving on violence and corruption.”319 
Kentucky further argued that the crime involved a fraud against the 
government, and fraud crimes have always been found to involve moral 
turpitude.320 
The Court, per Chief Justice Vinson, emphasized that it was 
deciding a narrow question of law—whether conspiracy to defraud the 
United States of taxes on distilled liquor was a CIMT.321 Because De 
George was twice convicted of the same crime, “whether certain other 
offenses involve moral turpitude is irrelevant and beside the point.”322 
 
 313.  De George, 341 U.S. at 228 (citation omitted). 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  Hearings before House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 10384, 
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1916) 
 316.  Id. at 17–18. 
 317.  Brief of Petitioner, Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (No. 348), 1951 WL 82136 
at *6. 
 318.  Id. 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 223–24 (1951). 
 322.  Id. at 226–27. 
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The Court then looked to the past judicial construction of the term 
“moral turpitude” to provide guidance for De George’s conviction. The 
Court held that, without exception, crimes involving fraudulent intent 
have been held to involve moral turpitude.323 
It was only then that the Supreme Court reached the constitutional 
issue: was the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” 
unconstitutionally void for vagueness?324 The Court raised the issue sua 
sponte.325 “It has been suggested,” the Court noted, that the term “lacks 
sufficiently definite standards to justify this deportation proceeding.”326 
The Court noted the phrase’s long history in American law and that 
no court had yet held the phrase vague or found it to violate due 
process.327 The Court then turned to the issue of what degree of scrutiny 
applied to challenges of immigration statutes on vagueness grounds. 
Prior vagueness decisions had applied a heightened level of scrutiny 
only to criminal statutes.328 The Court stated that the primary purpose 
of the vagueness doctrine was to ensure adequate warning of criminal 
consequences.329 Therefore, a criminal statute that does not provide 
adequate notice of criminal consequences violates due process of law. 
Interestingly, the Court did not cite to Yamataya v. Fisher,330 a 1903 
decision holding that procedural due process was necessary in 
deportation proceedings. It has been argued that the Court could have 
used Yamataya to justify the application of a criminal void-for-
vagueness analysis to immigration proceedings.331 Instead, the De 
George Court referenced the “grave nature” of removal proceedings to 
justify applying a criminal standard in the vagueness analysis.332 
The Court has stated that “deportation is a drastic measure and at 
times the equivalent of banishment or exile. It is the forfeiture for 
misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty.” 
 
 323.  Id. at 227–28. 
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Id. at 229–30. 
 326.  Id. 
 327.  Id. at 229–30. 
 328.  See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 
91, 103–04 (1945); De George, 341 U.S. at 230. 
 329.  De George, 341 U.S. at 230. 
 330.  189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 331.  See Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude is Void for Vagueness, 90 
NEB. L. REV. 647, 667–68 (2012). 
 332.  De George, 341 U.S. at 230. 
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We shall, therefore, test this statute under the established criteria of the 
“void for vagueness doctrine.”333 
Thus, the Court created another limit (along with Yamataya) on the 
general rule that immigration proceedings are to be regarded as merely 
civil in nature for purposes of constitutional analysis. 
The Court continued that the test for vagueness was not whether 
individuals would have sufficient notice of all imaginable violations of 
the statute; rather, the test was whether the language is sufficiently 
definite to provide warning with respect to the core conduct, measured 
by “common understanding and practices,” falling within the statute’s 
reach.334 Although the De George Court did not use the terminology of 
later decisions regarding “strict” versus “intermediate” scrutiny,335 it 
employed a form of intermediate scrutiny to the fraud statute sub 
judice. Had the Court used a test requiring that “all imaginable 
violations of the statute would provide sufficient notice to 
individuals,”336 that would have been what is now known as strict 
scrutiny. Instead, the Court applied a less-searching level of scrutiny, 
but more than simple rational basis review.337 The Court did not ask (as 
it would in rational basis review) whether there was any imaginable 
justification for Congress to use the phrase “moral turpitude,” however 
little warning it might provide to the average person. It staked out a 
category of “core conduct” covered by the CIMT statute, as measured 
by “common understanding and practices,” and asked whether the 
phrase “moral turpitude” provided “sufficiently definite . . . warning” 
with respect to that core conduct.338 The Court concluded that fraud has 
always been regarded as a crime involving moral turpitude.339 That is to 
say, the common understanding of fraud circa 1951 provided 
sufficiently definite warning to the average person in the United States 
that it was a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court did not ask 
 
 333.  Id. at 231 (internal citations omitted). 
 334.  Id. at 231–32. 
 335.  See generally, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (using 
“strict” scrutiny to analyze a sex-based distinction); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (using an 
intermediate level of scrutiny to analyze a sex-based distinction). 
 336.  De George, 341 U.S. at 231–32. 
 337.  It should be noted that, had the Court been applying the most deferential form of review, 
it would not have taken pains to hold that deportation carries consequences akin to criminal 
punishment if the Court had simply intended to apply rational basis review. If the Court had 
intended to apply rational basis review, it would simply have noted the obvious, which is that 
immigration proceedings are formally administrative, not criminal. 
 338.  Id. at 231–32. 
 339.  Id. at 232. 
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whether a diligent person could find out whether fraud was a crime 
involving moral turpitude, but instead essentially asked whether the 
immorality of fraud was so well known within the community that the 
average person would have to know without asking anyone or doing 
any research. The Court easily concluded that the fraud statute at issue 
in De George satisfied that standard.340 
Boutilier v. INS,341 a Supreme Court decision from 1967, does not 
contradict De George on the heightened scrutiny standard. In Boutilier, 
the Supreme Court held that “[t]he constitutional requirement of fair 
warning has no applicability to standards such as are laid down in” the 
section of the INA dictating inadmissibility.342 However, Boutilier is 
more properly read to apply only to non-criminal triggers for 
inadmissibility and deportation, and is arguably not good law at all. 
The petitioner in Boutilier was essentially deported for his sexual 
orientation.343 In applying for citizenship, Boutilier submitted an 
affidavit admitting that he had been charged with sodomy in 1959, and 
that the charge had been dismissed.344 Later, at the request of the 
government, he submitted another affidavit regarding his sexual 
behavior.345 The affidavit was submitted to the Public Health Service, 
which issued a certificate stating that Boutilier “‘was afflicted with a 
class A condition, namely, psychopathic personality, sexual deviate’” at 
the time of his admission.”346 Deportation proceedings were instituted 
against Boutilier under the theory that he had been inadmissible at the 
time of entry due to his “psychopathic personality.”347 Because 
Boutilier did not dispute the fact that he was a homosexual,348 the issue 
before the Supreme Court was whether “psychopathic personality” 
includes homosexuals, and whether the term is unconstitutionally void 
for vagueness.349 
The Court held that the requirement of fair warning does not apply 
to the exclusion of “those who possess those characteristics which 
Congress has forbidden.”350 The vagueness doctrine applies to fair 
 
 340.  Id. at 229. 
 341.  387 U.S. 118 (1967). 
 342.  Id. at 123. 
 343.  Id. at 119. 
 344.  Id. 
 345.  Id. 
 346.  Id. at 120. 
 347.  Id. at 119. 
 348.  We use the word “homosexual” because it is used throughout the Court’s opinion. 
 349.  Id. at 120. 
 350.  Id. at 119. 
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notice about future conduct (including future criminal conduct), not to 
certain forbidden characteristics. As to Boutilier’s argument—that, had 
he known his homosexual conduct could get him deported, he would 
have not engaged in it—the Court repeated that Boutilier’s 
deportation was based on his continuous “affliction” with 
homosexuality, not anything he had done since entry.351 Thus, “a 
standard applicable solely to time of entry could hardly be vague as to 
post-entry conduct.”352 
Boutilier does not contradict De George’s holding that immigration 
consequences triggered by future criminal conduct are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny. It holds only that the constitutional requirement 
of fair warning does not apply to statutorily enumerated characteristics 
of non-citizens that they already possess at the time of entry. The 
rationale of Boutilier is that, by definition, there is nothing that a non-
citizen can do after entering the United States to alter a characteristic 
he possessed when he entered the United States. Thus, Boutilier does 
not apply to removal proceedings based on crimes committed while in 
the United States, such as CIMTs. 
Additionally,  Boutilier may not be good law anymore. Never mind 
that Boutilier has been drastically undermined by the Court’s 
subsequent sexual orientation decisions.353 Even more on point, 
“psychopathic personality” has been deleted from the INA as a trigger 
for inadmissibility; it is unclear whether Boutilier survives the death of 
the provision at issue in it. After all, this is not a garden-variety deletion, 
made for stylistic or administrative reasons. The basis for Boutilier’s 
exclusion—the notion that all gays and lesbians have “psychopathic 
personalities” simply because of their sexual orientation—has long 
since been completely undermined.354 
Stepping back from the level-of-scrutiny issue for a moment, note 
that many courts have read De George as foreclosing any future 
vagueness attacks on the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude.”355 
 
 351.  Id. at 124. 
 352.  Id. 
 353.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (striking down Texas criminal 
sodomy statute); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (holding that there is a 
fundamental right to marry guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses). 
 354.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579; Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2607. 
 355.  See, e.g., Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. Circella v. 
Sahli, 216 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954); Ramirez v. United States INS, 413 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 
Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1024 (8th Cir. 1971). 
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This is a fundamental misinterpretation of De George. The De George 
Court was careful to articulate that, “whatever else the phrase ‘crime 
involving moral turpitude’ may mean in peripheral cases,” the holding 
specifically regarded crimes involving fraud.356 In other words, the 
Court was not testing the vagueness of CIMT generally, but only as it 
applied to that particular fraud statute. This is critical because it means 
that the Supreme Court is on record only as concluding that intentional 
false representations with the aim of wrongfully obtaining property 
present no problem of vagueness with respect to “moral turpitude,” not 
that most or even many other types of criminal offenses are clear with 
respect to CIMT. De George is the only case where the Supreme Court 
has directly addressed the issue of whether the moral turpitude 
doctrine is unconstitutionally vague and should be construed narrowly. 
ii. Padilla v. Kentucky 
Regarding the importance of immigration consequences, the Court 
went beyond De George in its landmark 2010 decision in Padilla v. 
Kentucky.357 There, the Court held that a criminal defendant is deprived 
of adequate representation in plea negotiations if his lawyer gives 
incorrect advice about immigration consequences of a plea, or if the 
lawyer altogether fails to give advice.358 The Court explicitly recognized 
that deportation proceedings are civil, but also acknowledged that 
deportation can be a severe consequence of a guilty plea.359 Padilla 
essentially acknowledges that immigration is quasi-criminal——a point 
that strongly supports De George’s application of heightened scrutiny 
to immigration. 
Padilla had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States 
for more than 40 years and had served in the U.S. Armed Forces.360 He 
pled guilty to drug distribution charges for transporting marijuana in 
his tractor-trailer, and deportation proceedings commenced.361 He 
claimed that his lawyer had failed to inform him of the immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea.362 Not only that, but he was told that he 
“did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in 
 
 356.  Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951). 
 357.  559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 358.  Id. at 365–67. 
 359.  Id. at 365. 
 360.  Id. at 359. 
 361.  Id. 
 362.  Id. 
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the country so long.”363 Padilla filed a pro se post-conviction motion to 
withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel.364 Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee to effective assistance of counsel did not extend to Padilla’s 
claim, as his deportation proceeding was a civil matter.365 Additionally, 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that there was no difference 
between failing to advise on a collateral matter and giving incorrect 
advice on a collateral matter.366 Deportation was held to be a collateral 
consequence of his criminal conviction, and therefore neither failing to 
advise nor giving incorrect advice were grounds for relief.367 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating: 
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe 
“penalty,” but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although 
removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless 
intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed 
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a 
century. And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration law 
have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of 
noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it “most difficult” to divorce the 
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. Moreover, 
we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of 
deportation for a particular offense find it even more difficult.368 
Because of the interwoven nature of deportation proceedings with 
criminal sentencing, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective counsel is applicable in deportation proceedings.369 Thus, 
despite the Court’s continuing statements that immigration 
proceedings are formally civil, it also often continues to treat such 
proceedings as de facto criminal. 
 
 363.  Id. 
 364.  See Peter Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1326 (2011) 
(citing Brief of Petitioner at 11, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651)). 
 365.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359. 
 366.  Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008). 
 367.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. 
 368.  Id. at 365. 
 369.  Id. at 366. 
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V. VAGUENESS AND CIMT 
A. Imprecision of Textual Standard 
Professor Julia Ann Simon-Kerr has demonstrated the seeming 
irreconcilability of decisions finding various offenses to be inside or 
outside the boundary of moral turpitude: 370 
Moral turpitude jurisprudence today suggests that society 
condemns as immoral the petty thief371 but not the person who 
attacks a police officer.372 If the federal courts are to be believed and 
the standard taken at face value, then “aggravated fleeing” is 
inherently base, vile, and depraved373 while some forms of 
aggravated assault do not violate community norms of morality.374 
Drunk driving repeatedly is deemed not to involve moral 
turpitude375 but drunk driving with a suspended license is assessed 
differently.376 All statutory rape involves moral turpitude but so did 
same-sex sodomy until it received constitutional protection in 
Lawrence v. Texas.377 In evidence law, moral turpitude jurisprudence 
holds that the prostitute lacks credibility378 but the batterer does 
not.379 
Professor Simon-Kerr’s analysis is only too well borne out by the above 
review of the judicial construction of CIMT. The law of CIMT consists 
of small pockets of predictability surrounded by a sea of chaos. 
The lack of guidance afforded by “moral turpitude” is not only the 
subject of academic criticism. Those who must apply it—judges and 
administrators—have voiced their bewilderment. It is impossible not to 
harken back to Justice Jackson’s dissent in Jordan v. De George, in 
which he lambasted the CIMT standard as “an undefined and 
undefinable standard.”380 One BIA decision stated, “Moral turpitude is 
a vague term. Its meaning depends to some extent on the state of public 
 
 370.  Simon-Kerr, supra note 46, at 1001. 
 371.  Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 261 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 372.  Zaranska v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 400 F. Supp .2d 500, 511 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 373.  Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 374.  Carr v. INS, 86 F.3d 949, 950–51 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 375.  Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 83–84 (BIA 2001) (en banc). 
 376.  Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 917 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 377.  539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 378.  See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, No. C052744, 2011 WL 1671560, at *24 (Cal. Ct. App. 
May 4, 2011) (“Misdemeanor conduct of prostitution represents a crime of moral turpitude.”). 
 379.  See, e.g., People v. Mansfield, 200 Cal. App. 3d 82, 88–89 (1988) (refusing to permit 
impeachment of a witness with a conviction of “felony battery” or “battery resulting in serious 
bodily injury” because that offense is not a “crime of moral turpitude”). 
 380.  Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 228–29 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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morals.”381 More recently, the BIA remarked: “[B]oth the courts and 
this Board have referred to moral turpitude as a ‘nebulous concept’ 
with ample room for differing definitions of the term.”382 “While the 
term ‘moral turpitude’ has been used in the law for centuries, it has 
never been clearly or certainly defined,” according to one federal 
district judge. “This is undoubtedly because it refers not to legal 
standards but rather to those changing moral standards of conduct 
which society has set up for itself through the centuries.”383 The Seventh 
Circuit called the moral turpitude standard “notoriously baffling.”384 
Various panels and judges in the Ninth Circuit have said, “We are not 
unmindful of the myriad decisions sponsoring various concepts of 
moral turpitude. They offer no well settled criteria”385; “‘Moral 
turpitude’ is perhaps the quintessential example of an ambiguous 
phrase”386; and “[T]he BIA’s precedential case law regarding the 
meaning of the phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ . . . is a mess 
of conflicting authority.”387 
B. Categorical Treatment of Offenses 
The Court in Johnson v. United States found the ACCA residual 
clause void for vagueness largely because the clause applied to 
underlying convictions on a “categorical” basis. The phrase “serious 
potential risk of physical injury,” however ambiguous it might seem to 
a layperson, did not become unconstitutionally vague until it was 
applied in a categorical manner rather than in a manner based on the 
facts of the actual case at bar.388 In determining how broad the 
“category” of any particular conviction was, courts were required to 
imagine hypothetical violations of the statute of conviction. This 
imaginative process pushed an already ambiguous statutory provision 
into the realm of vagueness. 
As with the ACCA residual clause, the CIMT clause is applied on a 
categorical basis. The government will doubtless point out, however, 
that the categorical analysis applied to the ACCA residual clause was 
 
 381.  In re D., 1 I. & N. Dec. 190, 193 (BIA 1942). 
 382.  In re Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1191 (BIA 1999). 
 383.  United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F.Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
 384.  Garcia-Meza v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 535, 536 (7th  Cir. 2008). 
 385.  Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 1957). 
 386.  Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 387.  Id. at 921 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 388.  Examples of cases where the Supreme Court analyzed prior convictions on a factual, 
rather than categorical, basis can be found in Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (immigration 
statute) and United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (federal criminal statute). 
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a different mode of categorical analysis than that applied in CIMT 
cases. In ACCA residual clause cases, the courts determined whether 
the conviction was for a felony that presented a “serious potential risk 
of physical injury” by gauging the ordinary or typical commission of 
the underlying felony, and then asking whether that factual scenario 
presented a serious risk of injury (we shall call this the “ordinary or 
typical commission” mode of categorical analysis). On the other hand, 
in CIMT cases, the courts determine whether the conviction 
categorically involved moral turpitude by gauging the “least culpable 
conduct” necessary to constitute the crime, and then asking whether 
that conduct involves moral turpitude (we shall call this the “least 
culpable conduct” mode of categorical analysis). Does this difference 
in modes of analysis render Johnson inapposite in the CIMT context? 
The Supreme Court has applied the “ordinary or typical 
commission” mode of categorical analysis in multiple ACCA residual 
clause cases.  In James v. United States,389 the question was whether 
attempted burglary in Florida posed a serious potential risk of injury. 
The Court imagined an ordinary attempted burglary and reasoned that 
it may actually be more dangerous than the ordinary completed 
burglary because the typical attempted burglary that is actually 
prosecuted has ended in “confrontation with a property owner or law 
enforcement officer.”390 In Chambers v. United States, the Court held 
that failure to report to a penal institution under Illinois law did not 
categorically fall within the residual clause.391 A key part of the Court’s 
analysis was imagining an ordinary or typical instance of failure to 
report and then observing that such an individual “would seem 
unlikely, not likely, to call attention to his whereabouts by 
simultaneously engaging in additional violent and unlawful 
conduct.”392 In Sykes v. United States, the felony at issue was vehicular 
flight from a police officer under Indiana law; the Court used statistics 
and an imagined, ordinary or typical vehicular flight scenario to find 
that such a felony did present a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another.393 
Taylor v. United States, on the other hand, is an ACCA decision that 
exemplifies the “least culpable conduct” mode of categorical 
 
 389.  550 U.S. 192 (2007). 
 390.  Id. at 204. 
 391.  555 U.S. 122 (2009). 
 392.  Id. at 128. 
 393.  131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). 
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analysis.394 In this analytical mode, the reviewing court tries to imagine 
non-conforming (overbroad) convictions under the statute at issue.395 
Usually, these non-conforming or overbroad fact scenarios represent 
the least culpable conduct that nonetheless violates the statute. To use 
the facts and statute of Taylor itself as an example, breaking out of a 
dwelling house, or breaking an interior door, seem like less culpable 
variations on burglary than unlawful entry into a dwelling house to 
commit a crime.396 Whether one agrees with the relative culpability 
evaluation, these variations are “overbroad” with relation to the 
general federal offense, which is to say, they permit conviction in some 
cases that would not be permitted under the federal standard.397 
Therefore, under Taylor, no conviction under these statutes may qualify 
for sentencing enhancement under the ACCA. So long as the reviewing 
court may not look at the actual facts of the case, there is no way to 
guarantee that the defendant’s convictions fall within the generic 
standard. 
The least culpable conduct approach of Taylor is the predominant 
mode of categorical analysis in both immigration and federal criminal 
jurisprudence,398 but it is not the only one. Because of their nature, some 
statutory standards are instead analyzed under the “ordinary or typical 
commission” mode used in the ACCA residual clause cases. But clearly, 
from the standpoint of vagueness, the difference between two modes of 
categorical analysis is irrelevant. Both categorical approaches involve 
an equal amount of judicial probing to detect the contours of the 
statute of conviction involved. Neither looks at the actual facts of the 
underlying conviction—both are entirely theoretical, based on 
imagined hypothetical fact patterns. 
The least culpable conduct analysis utilized in CIMT cases is at least 
as speculative and imaginative—and therefore as unpredictable—as 
the typical commission analysis in the residual clause cases. Consider 
the BIA’s well-known decision in Matter of Silva-Trevino.399 The 
 
 394.  495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
 395.  Id. at 580. 
 396.  See id. at 589—99. 
 397.  Id. 
 398.  See, e.g., Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001); Partyka v. Attorney General, 
417 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2005); Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2008); Rodriguez-Castro 
v. Gonzalez, 427 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 399.  24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (U.S. Atty. Gen. 2008), vacated by Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 550 (U.S. Atty. Gen. 2015). The Attorney General’s decision was itself later vacated in 
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). We 
discuss these cases not for their continuing precedential value, but because they illustrate the way 
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question was whether Silva-Trevino’s conviction in Texas for 
“indecency with a child” made him inadmissible as someone convicted 
of a CIMT, and therefore ineligible for discretionary relief in 
immigration court.400 The Texas statute made it “illegal for a person to 
engage in ‘sexual contact’ with a child younger than 17 years old who 
is not the person’s spouse, unless the person is ‘not more than three 
years older than the victim and of the opposite sex.’”401 Because the 
case came from Texas, the Board was bound by Fifth Circuit precedent 
regarding analysis in CIMT cases. That precedent included Rodriguez-
Castro v. Gonzales, in which the Fifth Circuit stated that courts trying 
to decide whether a particular conviction involved moral turpitude 
were required to view the underlying statute in terms of the “minimum 
criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute,”402 
which is a different way of expressing the “least culpable conduct” test. 
Using that test, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a conviction under the 
Texas “indecency with a child” statute did not qualify as a CIMT.403 The 
Board ruled, “Not every crime potentially ‘covered under . . . § 
21.11(a)(1) involves[s] conduct so depraved as to warrant classifying 
the statute as a whole as one involving moral turpitude.’”404 Although 
the statute covered many scenarios “clearly involv[ing] reprehensible 
conduct which is contrary to the accepted rules of morality,”405 not all 
convictions would necessarily fit that characterization: 
In contrast to statutory rape, . . . which typically involves 
penetration or something similar, the sexual conduct encompassed 
by [Texas Penal Code] § 21.11(a)(1) potentially involves much less 
intrusive contact. For example, a defendant in Texas has been 
convicted under the statute for touching the chest/breast of a 10-
year-old boy. See Sullivan v. State, 986 S.W. 2d 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1999). This raises the possibility that a 20-year-old woman dancing 
suggestively with a youth just under the age of 17, who represents 
himself as older and can reasonably be believed to be such, could 
be liable under the statute if she acted on a desire to arouse herself 
or a spectator. This is so even if she touched the victim through his 
 
in which the least culpable conduct analysis works. 
 400.  Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688. 
 401.  Id. at 690 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1) & (b)(1) (2003)). 
 402.  427 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 403.  Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 692. 
 404.  Id. 
 405.  Id. 
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clothing. This does not strike us as the type of behavior which would 
be classified as involving moral turpitude under the Act.406 
Although the conviction for touching the 10-year-old boy’s chest may 
have been real, the 20-year-old female dancer suggestively touching the 
chest of an almost 17-year-old male through his clothing is completely 
fictitious. The very process of ascertaining the “least culpable” or 
“minimum” conduct necessary to violate the statute requires judges to 
imagine cases not before the court. There is no purely logical, non-
arbitrary way to determine what conduct is less culpable than other 
conduct; it is an inherently subjective question. For example, if the 
woman dancer in the BIA’s hypothetical suggestively touched an 
almost 17-year-old girl’s chest through her clothing, would that be more 
or less culpable than suggestively touching a boy’s chest? Does it 
matter whether the case arises in Texas or, say, California? Moral 
turpitude has been an elastic phrase that has historically comported 
with the culture in which it is used. This notion of culture largely 
depends on both geography and the genders of the involved actors.407 
In Texas, one might argue that a female-on-female suggestive touching 
is less culpable, because of traditional playful behavior among girls. On 
the other hand, given that the touching is “suggestive,” one might argue 
that a female-on-female touching is more culpable than a female-on-
male touching. One might think that, in a socially conservative state 
like Texas, lesbian behavior is considered more blameworthy than in a 
socially liberal state like California. For that matter, one might think 
that a female-on-male touching is considered less culpable in a more 
sexually traditional state like Texas because the culture largely regards 
female-on-male touching as flattering rather than harmful. Ambiguities 
driven by gender and regional differences often reduce this analysis to 
a hopeless morass of unpredictability. 
Along these same lines, consider Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler.408 
There, the immigrant had been convicted in California for engaging in 
intercourse with a minor under 16 years of age when the perpetrator is 
21 years of age or older.409 A panel of the Ninth Circuit found this 
conviction did not constitute CIMT because the least culpable conduct 
 
 406.  Id. 
 407.  See Simon-Kerr, supra note 46, at 1007 (referencing the culturally dependent “honor 
code” norms around which the moral turpitude standard as developed). 
 408.  506 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 409.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(d) (West 2011). 
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necessary to come within the reach of this statute was not sufficiently 
morally turpitudinous.410 The panel explained: 
[A]mong the range of conduct criminalized by § 261.5(d), would be 
consensual intercourse between a 21-year-old (possibly a college 
sophomore) and a minor who is 15 years, 11 months (possibly a high 
school junior). That relationship may very well have begun when the 
older of the two was a high school senior and the younger a high 
school freshman and have continued monogamously without 
intercourse for two or three years before the offending event. On its 
face, such behavior may be unwise and socially unacceptable to 
many, but it is not “inherently base, vile, or depraved,” or 
accompanied by a “vicious motive or corrupt mind.”411 
Although this least culpable conduct analysis was performed correctly 
as a matter of law, it is striking how much creativity is involved. Note 
the panel’s embellishments regarding the fidelity and chastity of the 
relationship. It is impossible to predict ahead of time how far a court is 
willing to reach in finding extremely low-culpability conduct that 
nonetheless technically violates the statute. 
Still another example, this one outside the context of sexual 
behavior, is Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales.412 The immigrant had been 
convicted in California of domestic battery, which the sentencing 
enhancement statute defined as: 
When a battery is committed against a spouse, a person with whom 
the defendant is cohabitating, a person who is the parent of the 
defendant’s child, former spouse, fianc. . ., or fianc. . .e, or a person 
with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a 
dating or engagement relationship, the battery is punishable by a 
fine not exceeding two thousand dollars . . . , or by imprisonment in 
the county jail for a period of not more than one year, or by both 
that fine and imprisonment.413 
The Ninth Circuit panel held that this conviction did not constitute a 
CIMT because: 
For example, throwing a cup of cola on the lap of someone to whom 
one is or has been engaged, slightly shoving a cohabitant, or poking 
 
 410.  Quintero-Salazar, 506 F.3d at 694–95. 
 411.  506 F.3d at 693. Quintero-Salazar did not mention Duenas-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 
183 (2007), and its rule requiring that hypotheticals used in the least culpable conduct analysis 
must be supported by actual prosecutions. Duenas-Alvarez was handed down in January 2007; 
Quintero-Salazar was decided in October 2007. 
 412.  465 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 413.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1058 (West 2011). 
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the parent of one’s children rudely with the end of a pencil are all 
“offensive touchings” of qualifying individuals and can all constitute 
domestic battery . . . .414 
Can it honestly be said that this analysis involves less “judicial 
imagining” than the Supreme Court’s analyses in the residual clause 
cases? And yet in Johnson, the Court condemned its own analyses as 
contributing to the constitutionally fatal vagueness of the residual 
clause. 
The least culpable conduct cases involving sexual behavior most 
graphically illustrate the rampant creativity inherent in the analytical 
process. But even the U.S. Supreme Court’s burglary decisions under 
the ACCA illustrate the necessity of factual hypothesizing while 
conducting a least culpable conduct analysis. In Taylor v. United States, 
the Supreme Court ruled for Taylor based on the possibility that 
defendants in Missouri during the relevant time period had been 
convicted of burglary for breaking out of residences, or for breaking 
interior doors. There was no evidence before the Court to show that 
even a single person had been convicted for burglary in Missouri for 
such conduct, yet Taylor prevailed based on the Court’s hypothesizing. 
C. Why Duenas-Alvarez Fails to Cure the Notice Deficiency in CIMT 
for Vagueness Purposes 
The Supreme Court has been aware of the “judicial imaginings” 
problem with least culpable conduct analysis for some time. In 
Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez,415 the immigrant had been convicted in 
California of “taking a vehicle without consent.”416 The government 
attempted to remove Duenas-Alvarez, a permanent resident alien, 
under the portion of the INA that makes theft a basis for 
inadmissibility, and therefore, for removal.417 Before the Supreme 
Court, Duenas-Alvarez argued that the California statute pursuant to 
which he was convicted did not fall within the generic federal definition 
of theft because California’s aider and abettor doctrine reached 
broadly to cover all crimes that are the natural and probable 
consequences of the intended crime.418 Speaking for the Court, Justice 
Breyer rejected this argument, insisting that, in order to prevail, 
 
 414.  Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1061. 
 415.  549 U.S. 183 (2007). 
 416.  CAL. VEH. CODE § 10851(a) (West 2011). 
 417.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 418.  Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 190 (West 2007). 
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Duenas-Alvarez would have to show “something special about 
California’s version of the doctrine—for example, that California in 
applying it criminalizes conduct that most other states would not 
consider ‘theft.’”419 
At oral argument, Duenas-Alvarez’s counsel attempted to show 
that California’s version of natural and probable consequences did 
extend beyond that of most states.420 He offered the Justices a 
hypothetical in which California’s natural and probable consequences 
doctrine would support a conviction where “an individual who wrongly 
bought liquor for an underage drinker [would be] criminally 
responsible for that young drinker’s later (unforeseen) reckless 
driving.”421 
The Supreme Court, however, was unpersuaded. The Court 
reviewed the precedents and was unable to conclude that California’s 
natural and probable consequences doctrine “show[s] something 
special” above and beyond the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine in other states.422 This was enough to decide the case against 
Duenas-Alvarez because it meant the statute under which he was 
convicted was not overbroad with relation to the general federal 
definition of theft. However, the Court warned against the kind of 
hypothesizing that Duenas-Alvarez’s counsel had engaged in at oral 
argument: 
[I]n our view, to find that a state statute creates a crime outside the 
generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more 
than the application of legal imagination to a state statute’s 
language. It requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical 
possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls 
outside the generic definition of a crime. But he must at least point 
to his own case or other cases in which the state courts did in fact 
apply the statute in a special (nongeneric) manner for which he 
argues.423 
This dictum is why Duenas-Alvarez has become renowned in this field. 
In Moncrieffe v. Holder, which involved the antique firearms exception 
to firearms trafficking, the Court stated: “ 
 
 419.  Id. at 191. 
 420.  Id. 
 421.  Id. 
 422.  Id. 
 423.  Id. at 193. 
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Duenas-Alvarez requires that there be ‘a realistic probability, not a 
theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to 
conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.’ To 
defeat the categorical comparison in this manner, a noncitizen 
would have to demonstrate that the State actually prosecutes the 
relevant offense in cases involving antique firearms.”424  
It seems to be broadly accepted that, “in some cases, a noncitizen must 
make a showing that the convicting jurisdiction actually prosecutes the 
minimum conduct that the noncitizen claims is covered by the statute 
of conviction and that does not match the definition of the generic 
crime.”425 Less clear are cases where the hypothetical conduct in 
question is explicitly listed in the statute—for example, the Missouri 
burglary statutes in Taylor that enumerated breaking out of a building, 
or breaking an inner door, as sufficient to violate the statutes. Also less 
clear would be a case where the hypothetical conduct had explicitly 
been “imagined” by a state appellate court interpreting the criminal 
statute in question.426 At a minimum, though, Duenas-Alvarez 
sometimes requires immigration petitioners to demonstrate that the 
hypothetical conduct they claim makes a statute fatally overbroad has 
been actually prosecuted by the state. 
This requirement forms the basis for an objection to a vagueness 
challenge to CIMT. If interpreting statutes pursuant to the least 
culpable conduct test is tethered to actual prosecutions, then no 
“judicial imagination” is involved, and CIMT is not unconstitutionally 
vague. In other words, according to this argument, Duenas-Alvarez 
saves CIMT from unconstitutionality because it eliminates the weak 
link in the analytical chain: the notion of “least culpable conduct” is no 
longer subject to arbitrary hypothesizing by judges, but instead is 
captured by actual prosecutions. 
The answer to this objection, perhaps ironically, is that the practice 
under Duenas-Alvarez is sharply at odds with the theory of Duenas-
Alvarez. In the real world, it is extremely difficult to find out which 
conduct has been prosecuted and which has not. Very few state criminal 
prosecutions culminate in reported opinions. The vast majority of them 
are resolved by plea and are not contained in any statewide database 
 
 424.  569 U.S. 184, 206 (2013). 
 425.  NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD & IMMIGRANT DEF. 
PROJECT, THE REALISTIC PROBABILITY STANDARD: FIGHTING GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO 
USE IT TO UNDERMINE THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH 3 (Nov. 5, 2014), http://immigrant 
defenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/realistic-probability-advisory.pdf. 
 426.  Id. 
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that would allow a researcher to access the underlying conduct that was 
involved.427 If a judge, prosecutor, defense lawyer, immigration official, 
or immigrant wanted to find out whether a particular type of conduct 
had ever actually been prosecuted under a particular statute, there 
would be no comprehensive way to find out.428 Individual immigration 
defense lawyers and immigration judges will know of certain actual 
prosecutions anecdotally—as where they handled those cases 
themselves, or where they hear of such prosecutions through the 
grapevine. That has happened since Duenas-Alvarez was handed down, 
and it will continue to happen sporadically. But it is simply not possible 
to run searches in a single database—or even in any combination of 
currently existing databases—to know whether any particular type of 
conduct has ever been prosecuted under a certain statute. 
Duenas-Alvarez thereby loses its ability to restore certainty, 
predictability—and therefore, notice—to least culpable conduct 
analysis. From the standpoint of an immigrant who would like to avoid 
a conviction that will ultimately be considered a CIMT, there are 
certain statutes that may or may not qualify depending on how far 
down the tail of the Bell curve (in terms of culpability of conduct) 
courts are going to go. Duneas-Alvarez would put a determinate limit 
on how far they can go, if there were some available method of finding 
out which conduct has been prosecuted and which conduct has not’. 
But there is no such method. If an immigrant came to an immigration 
defense lawyer and asked whether the violation of a particular statute 
will be considered CIMT, the lawyer would only be able to answer with 
any degree of certainty if there happened to be clear appellate opinions 
on point. The lawyer would not be able to extrapolate from those cases 
to other statutes, no matter how facially similar, because there is no way 
to know in advance how far the least culpable conduct analysis will go 
for that other statute. Duenas-Alvarez would be irrelevant to the 
advising lawyer unless he or she happened to know that a certain type 
of conduct had actually been prosecuted. If the facts underlying that 
actual prosecution clearly render the statute overbroad relative to 
CIMT, then the lawyer’s answer will be certain. Critically, however, 
 
 427.  See Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 
2012),http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-
system.html?mcubz=3 (asserting that ninety percent of criminal cases are never tried). 
 428.  Although we were unable to find documentation, one of us (Lee) has been told by 
numerous prosecutors and immigration defense lawyers that states do not have searchable 
databases of individual prosecutions, such that one would be able to ascertain the alleged facts of 
cases. 
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“actually prosecuted” does not mean the same thing as judicially 
declared to fall within the statute. It merely means that some 
prosecutor somewhere in the state once filed charging papers based on 
that conduct (note that it would not help matters if Duenas-Alvarez 
were recalibrated to operate based on actual convictions rather than 
actual prosecutions, because the vast majority of guilty pleas are never 
memorialized in published opinions). 
It is critical to remember precisely what about the ACCA residual 
clause rendered it unconstitutionally vague. The key to vagueness 
under Due Process is a failure to give adequate notice to ordinary 
individuals about what conduct a law condemns, a lack of standards 
that would otherwise permit law enforcement to avoid arbitrary 
enforcement, or both. As the Johnson Court stated: 
Our cases establish that the government violates [due process] by 
taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law 
so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the 
conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary 
enforcement.” * * * We are convinced that the indeterminacy of the 
wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair 
notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.429 
Although this quotation discusses “criminal law,” that makes no 
difference to the analysis of CIMT. Under Jordan v. De George, 
immigration laws are analyzed at the same level of scrutiny as criminal 
laws for vagueness purposes. Because least culpable conduct analysis 
inevitably hinges on a reach of indeterminate distance down the tail of 
the Bell curve of possible conduct—and because Duenas-Alvarez in the 
real world is incapable of bestowing determinacy on the distance of 
that reach—CIMT both fails to give ordinary immigrants fair notice of 
what can get them deported and fails to provide the standards that 
could help prevent DHS or the INS from arbitrarily enforcing it. 
VI. REMEDIES 
If CIMT is unconstitutionally vague as applied to some offenses, 
such as involuntary manslaughter, assault, and sex offenses, then the 
next question is what remedy should be provided. The dilemma is 
whether to invalidate CIMT on an offense-by-offense basis, or whether 
to invalidate it on its face. The case law is unambiguous with respect to 
some offenses, most prominently murder and forcible rape, so why 
 
 429.  Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015). 
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throw the baby out with the bathwater? Why not simply invalidate 
CIMT for individual offenses where the case law is unpredictable? The 
short answer is that a limited “remedy” for vagueness will not cure the 
overall constitutional problem, which is unpredictability in whatever of 
CIMT jurisprudence remains. 
The biggest problem with an offense-by-offense approach is the 
nature of incremental precedent creation. Unless CIMT is declared 
unconstitutional on its face, individuals will continue to face 
uncertainty about whether particular convictions will count as CIMT. 
The most traditional remedial approach would be for federal courts 
and the BIA to confront the possible vagueness of any particular type 
of conviction on an individual petitioner basis. Suppose that a federal 
court were to hold CIMT unconstitutional with respect to a conviction 
for assault with a deadly weapon (ADW). Criminal defense lawyers 
could then advise their clients that convictions under conventional 
ADW will never count as CIMT. But what about assault with intent to 
kill or assault with intent to rape? Murder and forcible rape, after all, 
are CIMT. There would be no way for a defense lawyer to give reliable 
advice on whether to take a plea offer on either of those varieties of 
assault. The federal court with the ADW case could reach out to opine 
that all sub-species of assault no longer qualify as CIMT, but such a 
holding would merely constitute a facial invalidation in miniature, with 
all the same separation-of-powers concerns as a facial invalidation 
across all offenses. 
Facial invalidation often presents separation-of-powers concerns 
precisely because it requires a court to decide cases not before it. An 
appellate decision involving a CIMT issue presents the question of 
whether one particular conviction qualifies as CIMT. But vagueness 
presents a unique dynamic: the very reason that vague statutes violate 
due process is that they create a constitutionally unacceptable 
uncertainty about how future cases will be treated. Unless federal 
appellate courts—preferably the Supreme Court—announce that 
CIMT is unenforceable with respect to all convictions, it will be 
impossible to stop the guessing game as to which remaining species of 
offenses are and are not CIMT. To take just one example, even if a 
federal appellate court were to rule that CIMT is void for vagueness 
with respect to “all offenses other than murder and forcible rape,” this 
would leave uncertainty as to child sex statutes not yet enacted at the 
time of the appellate ruling. The conduct proscribed in child sex 
statutes comes in all varieties, from the relatively innocuous 
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“annoying” of a child (which in the future could merely constitute 
sexually offensive Internet name-calling) all the way to physical genital 
molestation. 
The remedial dynamic for vagueness, then, must differ from 
remedies for other constitutional maladies.430 Yet there is an even more 
specific reason why facial invalidation is required when a statute has 
run afoul of Johnson. The nub of the problem is that the “least culpable 
conduct” test in CIMT doctrine inevitably involves an arbitrary degree 
of judicial imaginings. Ex ante, it is impossible for lawyers to predict 
how creative federal courts will get in hypothesizing conduct that 
would qualify under the statute of conviction, yet would not involve 
“moral turpitude.” Recall the hypothetical 20-year-old female dancer 
suggestively touching the chest of an almost 17-year-old male audience 
member in a nightclub routine.431 How is a defense lawyer supposed to 
know whether a conviction under this “indecency with a child” statute 
qualifies as CIMT or not? Is the federal court in his prospective 
immigration case going to go to that extreme length in hypothesizing 
innocuous fact situations, or is the federal court in his case going to stick 
to locally familiar anecdotes? This is why facial invalidation is the only 
remedy that will truly get to the root of the problem. 
In Johnson, the Court never considered limiting the remedy to the 
petitioner’s case, or to convictions for possession of a short-barreled 
shotgun.432 After Johnson, the residual clause of the ACCA is 
unenforceable in any case, no matter how obviously dangerous the 
underlying conviction may be. This is precisely because of the nature of 
vagueness as a constitutional violation. Although with any rule there 
will be uncertain applications at the margins, the problem with vague 
laws is that the margins dominate the cores. Rather than a large number 
of applications where the law produces a certain result, leaving a small 
 
 430.  Adjudications of vagueness are normally accompanied by facial invalidations. See, e.g., 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 50 (1999) (“[W]e conclude that the ordinance enacted by 
the city of Chicago is unconstitutionally vague.”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) 
(“We conclude that  § 647(e) is unconstitutionally vague on its face.”); City of Cincinnati v. 
Coates, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971) (affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio that the 
statute was unconstitutional on its face); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); 
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). But cf. Parker 
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (“[O]ne who has received fair warning of the criminality of his 
own conduct from the statute in question is [not] entitled to attack it because the language would 
not give similar fair warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its broad and 
literal ambit.”). 
 431.  Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 690 (2008). 
 432.  135 S. Ct. 2551. 
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number of applications where the law leaves uncertainty, vague laws 
present the opposite situation. Partly because of the elasticity of the 
phrase “serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” and partly 
because of the judicial discretion involved in the categorical analysis of 
underlying convictions, the result in Johnson was to produce islands of 
certainty surrounded by a sea of uncertainty. The same is true of CIMT. 
Although some offenses have consistently been treated as CIMT, such 
as murder and forcible rape, there are many others, surveyed above, 
whose CIMT status is put in doubt by conflicting precedent. 
To cap off this point about “least culpable conduct” analysis and 
vagueness, consider the superficially absurd question of whether first-
degree, premeditated murder “categorically” constitutes a CIMT. In 
one North Carolina case, the defendant was convicted of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to life in prison after he shot his dying father.433 
In affirming the finding of premeditation, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court noted that the defendant brought a gun to the hospital, cocked 
it prior to each of his four shots, and later admitted that he had 
promised his father not to let him suffer.434 In his dissent, the Chief 
Justice protested that “[o]ur law of homicide should not be so roughly 
hewn as to be incapable of recognizing the difference” between 
“someone who kills because of a desire to end a loved one’s physical 
suffering caused by an illness which is both terminal and incurable” and 
“one who kills because of unmitigated spite, hatred or ill will.”435 A 
federal judge who must decide whether a premeditated murder 
conviction categorically qualifies as a CIMT could consider such a case 
as the “least culpable conduct” sufficient to constitute premeditated 
murder—and it is hardly clear whether such a case involves moral 
turpitude. The nationwide debates occasioned by the well-chronicled 
crusade of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, aka “Dr. Death,” too well reinforce the 
difficulty of clear moral lines even in some murder cases.436 Even with 
respect to the offenses thought to be uncontroversial as CIMT, the 
categorical clarity may be illusory. 
CONCLUSION 
Those unfamiliar with immigration law may be surprised and upset 
to hear that people can be deported for crimes involving “moral 
 
 433.  State v. Forrest, 321 N.C. 186, 188 (1987). 
 434.  Id. at 188–90. 
 435.  Id. at 200 (Exum, J., dissenting). 
 436.  People v. Kevorkian, 248 Mich. App. 373, 381 (2001). 
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turpitude.” Whether 18th and 19th Century America had a high degree 
of moral consensus, 21st Century America does not. In 19th Century 
Iowa, it might have seemed indubitable that a conviction for cow 
poisoning involved moral turpitude.437 But that certitude was the 
function of time and place. The relentlessly increasing complexity and 
heterogeneity of our society render any such consensus an illusion. For 
the government to be able to remove lawful permanent residents—
many of whom have lived here for decades—based on such a 
contestable concept as moral turpitude violates the basic principle of 
the rule of law. Our society believes it acceptable to visit harsh 
consequences on individuals for violating the law because we believe 
laws are objective and impersonal. On the contrary, to hinge a law 
authorizing deportation on morality is to visit among the harshest of 
consequences based on subjectivity and the personal beliefs of officials. 
It might well be said that every law has some “vague” applications. 
Over the decades, this truism may have discouraged the Court from 
declaring CIMT unconstitutionally vague. The slope may have seemed 
too slippery. But Johnson v. United States has changed the 
constitutionally acceptable threshold where a completely amorphous 
statutory standard has, through “categorical” analysis, led to a long, 
documentable history of judicial inconsistency in application. Now, 
“moral turpitude” is not just another statutory term with too much 
wiggle room in it. The fact that “moral turpitude” must be gauged on a 
categorical basis, dependent on an inescapably unpredictable degree of 
judicial willingness to hypothesize “least culpable conduct,” separates 
CIMT from other textual standards in immigration and criminal law.438 
What has long been true as a matter of common sense has now became 
legally correct. Deporting anyone on the basis of a conviction for a 
“crime involving moral turpitude” violates the Due Process Clause 
because the standard on its face is void for vagueness. 
 
 
 437.  See Burton v. Burton, 3 Greene 316 (Iowa 1851). 
 438.  Although not necessarily from all other standards, see Koh, supra note 4. 
